← 返回

2026.09.23 | TB | Retail | Vietnam Grocery Retail Economics

原标题：Vietnam's Grocery Retail – Rural Store Networks & New Store Economics

#consumer

Third Bridge · 2026-09-23

Analyst-led • 10 Sep 2026

Huynh Phuong Vo (HPV) Independent Consultant

Izabella Yan (IY) — Third Bridge Sector Analyst

Agenda

Key Insights

Introduction

IY [00:00:01]: Welcome to Third Bridge Interview entitled Vietnam's Grocery Retail – Rural Store Networks & New Store Economics. I'm Izabella Yan and I'll be facilitating today's Interview with Huynh Phuong Vo, former head of new store opening at MM Mega Market Vietnam.

Before we start today's Interview, please state I agree or I disagree to the following statement: You understand the definition of material non-public information and agree not to disclose any such information, or any other information which is confidential, during this Interview.

HPV [00:00:39]: I agree.

IY [00:00:50]: Thank you very much. Could you begin with a brief introduction to your background, please?

HPV [00:00:58]: I have been known as an operational excellence and turnaround expert. My latest work is NSO, New Store Development Director at MM Mega Market. I have totally more than 28 years working in retail, FMCG, B2B professional and F&B as well. Some of my proven track records could be listed as following, Metro Cash & Carry, I've been in Hong Vietnam for at least six stores and I led the turnaround of four stores, including head office store, Thăng Long, Hanoi store and other two Ho Chi Minh City stores, which were top four and they got troubled on my visit. I also be the COO of Central Retail Vietnam in charge of Nguyen Kim electronic store centre with more than 55 malls nationwide. I reduced the debts by 30% via supply chain restructuring, launched strategic concepts in F&B and fashion named Brenton and Home Kitchen. I'm the only one general manager of The Pizza Co from Thailand and Domino's Pizza from USA. I'm the only one GM who've been trained in both Thailand and USA for brand management and operational management. I also worked for Unilever Vietnam in charge of GT development and HoReCa channel development as well. That's a brief about my background. I hope I can help our client to understand more about the Vietnam grocery market.

Questions

[00:03:46] Could you outline 2-3 key trends and developments that are shaping Vietnam's grocery retail market?

HPV [00:03:55]: Actually, let me do first the Vietnam retail market first because grocery is one part of that and let's see what the retail market growth scale and channel shift for 2025. Then we talk more about grocery in that context to be much more understanding. First of all, in 2025, the total retail market size is at about USD 270bn, about 9% YoY growth vs 2024 and modern trade share, MT share is 27%. Within that, e-commerce market, about USD 25bn, more than USD 25bn. Around 10% is the e-commerce and Vietnam e-commerce market is the third largest in Southeast Asia. Also the growth rate, YoY growth of e-commerce is more than 20%, so very high. Then the modern trade channel map, we can define the channel map for much of the channel. First, the hypermarket, the strength of hypermarkets is one-stop B2B and B2C channel. Key players are Big C, Aeon, MM Mega Market. Second channel is supermarket, focused on fresh food and trust, which is occupied by Co.opmart, WinMart, Lotte Mart and Big C.

Then the mini mart and CVS channel with mini mart, they focus on proximity and fresh with the key players, Bach Hoa Xanh and WinMart+ and the very, very explosive channels recent two years, CVS and for Circle K, GS25, 7-Eleven, which is focusing on convenience and 24/7 service. Then shopping malls is Vincom, Aeon and Lotte are the key players growing stably and focus on experience and lifestyle. That's the channel map and home retail market. For grocery alone, let me figure out some highlights about the market. First of all, we could say that the market itself is shifting from the land grab battle for operational excellence and WinCommerce competes on equity and value, while Bach Hoa Xanh competes on freshness and efficiency. Overall gross margin of the grocery and the channel store level P&L is about 22-25% gross margin. SG&A is about 18-22% and EBITDA store level, not head office, includes store level 1-4%. That is about unit economics of the grocery channel. Let's talk about the margin of the channel, the grocery market. Net profit margin is about 3% to sum up, maybe 3% is low, but in this channel, 3% is a record high compared to last year, only 1.7%.

Why is there a double growth there? Because four factors we could see from those key players. First, they restructured their operational process and logistic supply chain as well. They shift from FMCG dry food to fresh food dominant. Fourthly, they improved the execution at store. We could see, for example, the mini mart, the mini super market being improved a lot in terms of layout and experience for customer flow and sales density. They focus on that to get average revenue by store and reaching to VND 2.1bn per month for major store. That's also a high record. To sum up for the grocery market, industry structure, we can say three points. First, rural mini mart is a blessing. Modern trade penetration is only 13-15%. Major players, they are aggressively expanding into rural and suburban area where still a very big market occupied by wet markets, 85% there. Secondly, the industry structure is now fresh foods-focused. Actually, grocery are shifting from dry food to high-quality fresh food. Why? Because this could help drive daily footfall and directly compete with local market.

Thirdly, the structure change in the market polarisation. We've seen that the growth of those key players are heavily skewed towards proximity for mini mart and CVS, I mean. They own could reach 10,000 outlets own key players nationwide this year. Two key players are WinCommerce and the Bach Hoa Xanh. The two will reach 10,000 already. For this year, Q4 and next year outlook, we can see especially Q4 this year is another strongest quarter as well due to Lunar New Year. Overall, we forecast retail sector projected to grow YoY at 16% for this year and key players grow about 15-20% and next year would be more. That's the overall about the retail market and key players performance of grocery. Do you have any question about those?

[00:12:18] What is the share of hypermarkets, supermarkets, mini-marts and convenience stores in the total Vietnamese grocery space? How is this structure changing, and how might that mix shift as a percentage over the next 3-5 years?

HPV [00:12:43]: Because of the actual economic units reasons drive the key players, their board members and the strategy changes. For example, based on the performance of revenue and basket size and margin as well, we could see that Bach Hoa Xanh, they are the highest sales per store, average per store and it's about VND 55m per store per day. That's about, let's say, USD 2,500 per store per day. WinCommerce half of that and the urban market store sales is less, but less CAPEX. The EBIT and EBITDA is much better. Based on that testing, they are now opening more in the rural and we can see the trend, different trend. The guys from the north, like WinCommerce, they go in to south. The guys from the south, Bach Hoa Xanh, they are going north. WinCommerce, they pushed this year 1,000-1,500 new store to reach 2,000. They already opened 350 new stores H1 already and they focused 70% in rural area. Bach Hoa Xanh also, they go in north and they push not inside of the city, not inside at the centre of Hanoi, but they go into tier 2 province like Ninh Binh, on the surrounding area of Hanoi and they opened already over 630 stores H1.

Based on those trends and what happened with their supermarket, hypermarket and the mini mart CVS growing, we can say that hypermarket, supermarket growth is steady at about combined annual rate is about 5% and that takes a lot of CAPEX and OPEX as well. They keep moving on, but very steady and slow. The real battle very early stage now in the form of mini mart, CVS and those small size urban model and they all focus to urban area or suburban and tier 2. One of the reasons they avoid to go in the city, tier 1, if you know the rental rate in Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi, the centre CBD area in the centre of the city, the rental is about USD 150 per square metre. Even that is the small size also a big amount of rental as well as the salary, payroll, also very high for hiring people inside the city. Want or not, they avoid inside of the city and open more and more in tier 2 and around the city. We can say the catchment areas now is rural population. The category now is fresh food. Of course, they keep the daily basic FMCG dry food, but fresh food is a key driver.

Store level OPEX low and rural area, rental low to compensate for utility costs, cold chain for fresh food and logistics and if we look into the market that view, we understand why WinCommerce, they invested in their own logistics and supply chain company. They have their own and that help to reduce a lot of logistics and supply chain cost to less than 4%. That company is named Supra. Based on that because of that investment, their operation, their stock level, service level, everything improved a lot and turned from loss to gain, the WinCommerce side.

[00:18:34] Why are the logistics costs so high, and what level of optimisation have operators been able to achieve?

HPV [00:18:49]: The more they open and if the whole store network centralised or focused in one area, it will be easy for delivering, especially fresh foods because that fresh daily delivery. They don't try to keep stock much at the store because of the warehouse and the area, the layout is very small. Daily delivery for fresh food and because of that, if you have 100 stores within Ho Chi Minh City, you know it's easier. One central warehouse in Bình Điền and then deliver every morning with 10 truck to that. Now the solution depend on is nationwide. They have to build in advance the real estate and I mean, the DC, distribution centre for 3,000-6,000 mini mart CVS that are different without system, without in-house solution, they have to hire third party. The case study of WinCommerce, they used to hire a third party outside and the cost is always higher than 8-10% in terms of delivery costs, warehouse, renting, cold chain, all of those supply chain issues. They decided themselves to invest in digital technology, cold chain, warehouse, trucks, all in-house for the ecosystem and that cut the cost because, of course, that is separate companies, I mean, the supply chain company, they have their own P&L.

They have their gain and loss, but they utilise the efforts of the in-house for maximised truck route and system and also buy it in bulk. The power to buy in big quantity when they have that in-house company in charge of supply chain and logistics. All of those together with the technology they invest in warehouse management system and route tracking, they save the cost of transportation and also the cost of handling the fresh foods products. You may know if we buy a salad or fish or a shrimp from supplier and directly deliver to store by supplier or by third party, the cost is very high or even the shrinkage, 20% or 30%, but if we have our central warehouse DC, our own, we handle everything there and we buy it in big quantity, we reduce the shrinkage level, we push the supplier to deliver in less waste of the product with our own specification.

By that, less waste, less shrinkage, on-time delivery and high spec at the store level. They keep the price competitive enough compared to wet market, of course, higher than the wet market. For example, if you buy a cabbage from wet market, actually, if you use your kitchen, you have to cut it out and handle it with 20% or 30% waste, right, but via the DC and central warehouse, the waste come to nearly zero at the DC directly to store. No more handle everything packed and ready, just sell it out, sell it to customer. By doing that, they cut half of the cost to less than 4% in terms of supply chain, logistics, cold chain, everything. That's a good case study.

IY [00:23:49]: Do you think these supply chain optimisations can be achieved across the entire network, or are they specific to proximity formats? Within what specific operating radius are these proximity models most effective?

HPV [00:23:58]: The whole of their network as I mean, they established a company with thousands of billion Vietnam Dong capital to handle those nationwide supply chain network. Of course, there are some items. They have to buy fresh at local market and local supplier because that will be more economic than from DC. They let about 10% or 20% for store to buy from local supplier, local farm, but 80% of fresh food was from DC.

[00:25:04] How does an optimised supply chain impact rural expansion possibilities, particularly the volume of new store openings?

HPV [00:25:19]: I think because their current store network, for example, WinCommerce 1,000, Bach Hoa Xanh 3,000, mostly around big city, tier 1 only. Talk about tier 2, where wet market still gain 85% of the market and we got still a lot potential there. I think if they already proven that model by small format, strong assortment with the hero product from DC and local farm purchasing policy. I do think that, for example, the target of WinCommerce to open 1,500 stores that's reachable this year. Next year, if they can open that number, another 1,000 or 2,000 is achievable, Bach Hoa Xanh as well. Also, they not only open new store, also they closed the lost store. They know exactly the model and how it works. Now I think the right time for them to compete, first, they will compete with wet market in tier 2 rural area. Then for the next two years, after two years, maybe in the second or third year, they compete each other by cannibalisation. First, cannibalise with wet market and after that, these two guys will compete each other.

[00:27:26] What proportion of rural network expansion involves formal grocery chains entering brand new markets vs increasing store density in regions where they already operate?

HPV [00:27:49]: Let's say about the market share, 85% now in rural area belong to wet market and based on what's happening, I think at least they could occupy 50% more. Within maybe next 5-10 years, we won't see wet market anymore like developed countries. They will be only supermarkets, hypermarkets, CVS and mini mart only. Of course, the e-commerce only. E-commerce still, for example, some key players now are not only doing physical business for grocery, they are doing also delivery fresh and that's grown to this size now. More and more, I think maybe next two years, they could occupy 50% and five years, no more wet markets, maybe five or 10 years, but no more and physical store network together with e-commerce, will occupy all.

[00:29:15] How might store performance vary across micro-markets and operators, and could there be significant differences in store-level operational strategies?

HPV [00:29:37]: I have a research on that. Let me look at it. I call that the path to profitability. We remarked in the research that Vietnam grocery market now is shifting from growth at all costs to operational excellence and sustainable profitability. You could see that WinCommerce are closing their loss store, that is shifting and fighting here is, I mentioned about the gross margin already 23-25% cannot more, but that level is good already. Logistics is key battleground. Bach Hoa Xanh already doing good in their own in-house supply chain, etc, WinCommerce will do because they have double store. They will do. WinCommerce scale is paying off. They open a lot. They get lost so far in the last five, 10 years, but now they're paying off. They have their own private label strategy, which is very successfully driven to sustainable profitability. Number four, there's another guy, another name player who are getting lost and may be occupied M&A by the other two guys, a Saigon Co.op. Yes, they very struggle for their large format and high operating cost model and they are the lowest EBIT margin in those groups.

For example, let's do a compare these three key players, Bach Hoa Xanh, WinCommerce and Saigon Co.op. First of all, the SG&A cost, Bach Hoa Xanh is only 21%, WinCommerce, 23%, 1% of 2%, 2% or 3% higher than Bach Hoa Xanh because of the logistics. Saigon Co.op, 26% higher SG&A. What caused them to height in this cost. The logistics cost is over 6.5%. While Bach Hoa Xanh is only 4%, WinCommerce 5%. Staff costs, Saigon Co.op 10-11%, while the other two guys, only 9%. The rent, Bach Hoa Xanh 4%, WinCommerce 3.5% because WinCommerce is a little smaller than Bach Hoa Xanh, but Saigon Co.op is 5%. Based on that, the EBIT margin, Saigon Co.op is minus 2.5%, but Bach Hoa Xanh and WinCommerce is 2% higher. If we look at that, we can say Bach Hoa Xanh and WinCommerce, they got the right model. They invest in the right supply chain and they will open faster for those model, small format, mini mart and CVS and they will occupy Saigon Co.op if this guy don't change, don't do the restructure costs, especially SG&A. That's the story we say sustainable profitability way for strategic implications. I don't know who is the client, but let's do the remarks for those three guys.

For Bach Hoa Xanh, the challenge is to maintain the operational edge while expanding network. The focus should be on replicating logistic and supply chain model. In new regions, they had to expand and prepare for their supply chain model there, central and north because Bach Hoa Xanh, they are the south and they are going north and central, they need to prepare that for opening. For WinCommerce, the path to higher margin lies in leverage scale to further optimise in SG&A. There are some parts of that like supply chain is higher 2%. They need to look at that. Saigon Co.op fundamental structure required to do and they will die. That would be three remarked indication for those guys if your client would like to study.

[00:35:29] Do you think Bach Hoa Xanh could realistically replicate its southern success as it expands into northern Vietnam?

HPV [00:35:44]: Actually, you know that they are testing. Bach Hoa Xanh, they are opening in the west and north gateway of Hanoi. They don't go directly to Hanoi or a province about 120km from Hanoi. They are testing with rural first. As I mentioned, if they go directly to Hanoi and put their store in the city, they will die soon.

USD 150 per square metre, you imagine, cannot survive. They do that test. They model in rural area first to check the assortment, to check the supply chain and operation procedure, etc, to see how it work.

[00:36:56] You mentioned that opening 1,000 new stores is quite achievable in the rural network. Given that WinCommerce is reporting payback periods of 1-1.5 years, what is driving these short timelines? Moving forwards, will the market be able to absorb these new rural stores at the same pace?

HPV [00:37:33]: Good question. Actually, their initial plan to get payback at about 1.5 years only, very aggressive. Actually, the model works at about three years averagely. Three years in this retail market is acceptable for supermarket, maybe five years or eight years, not over 10 years. I sit in the BOD meeting in Mega Market to check and approve for the IB of new hypermarket, eight years, 10 years, 15 years, those big guys, very long payback, but those small format asking for 1.5 years is very challenged and they are doing now three years is okay. Why they can do three years? Firstly, small format, small investment in terms of CAPEX and also they manage the OPEX number of staff at store. With some thousand stores already, they established an operational procedure and SOP clear and strong enough for. For example, only five staff for one store, whole day, whole week, no more. They also invest in supply chain and logistics. They less and less handle work and semi handle and produce everything done at the DC and store staff, put on the shelf and doing the outstock check and replenishment and checkout only. Very light CAPEX and OPEX operation model. That's first half.

Secondly, they don't fight for the front of house, front of street or corner of the street anymore. Two years, three years ago, yes, they fight for that for branding. They put anywhere at the corner and push the marketing budget to that store for branding, but now they already got the awareness. They don't invest in that anymore. They may go to the secondary street or inside of the community area, not at this big street anymore. The rental is down a lot. One of the highest business rental for retail and F&B highest in Southeast Asia is Vietnam. We are double or triple than Thailand. For example, rental for a restaurant or a retail store at Thailand is about 4-5% on sales. In Vietnam, it's 10% or 15% or even 20%, if you get the corner of the street. That's very high. With new strategy and already done the awareness, they go to the secondary street or community area with lower rental.

Thirdly, they invest in the supply chain and logistics and DC, even central kitchen, they are now lowering the wastage and shrinkage to a very optimised level already. They save about 5-7% there as well. They use that to invest in other reducing price a little to compete with wet market or compensate for the inflation, they keep the price stable for top 20 essential items. By doing that way, they got more footprint, more traffic and less cost and convert that into double EBIT, like I mentioned, from 1.7-3% or 4%.

[00:42:10] You noted that major grocery operators already possess the brand awareness needed to drive footfall. Are the specific consumer catchments and geographical locations selected by these operators optimal for expansion? Geographically, do the population and average income levels of these targeted areas support the assumptions for such aggressive payback periods?

HPV [00:42:51]: Let's say they open a store, a mini mart or a CVS in an area of about 5,000 households and concentrated, that's enough for them to open a store. With that model, 5,000 household, a small format, some area, they can get breakeven immediately for the first three months, sales level, I mean, sales level reaching to breakeven immediately show. That is the standard of opening new store, about 5,000 households and within that area, there's maybe a wet market, very ready, funny, one of those, they open directly in front of the wet market, directly compete with wet market, do it. They are smart to open that. First of all, I'm so curious why? How can you compete with the wet market? Wet market, they open only from 05:00 to about 10:00 or 11:00, then they close.

But those guys, they open 24/7. High-quality hygiene with certification, aircon, everything. Customer can pay 10%, 15%, 20% higher. Of course, there is some category, but with meat, egg, some kind of vegetable, they sell even equal price to wet market to get traffic, but other, especially dry. They get margin from dry food. That's the way they build, I call that the winning model. The expansion team will go to one area checking that wet market, yes, crowd enough, yes, close in the afternoon, yes and 5,000 households, it is some competitor, if there are one or two competitors, they come immediately. If no competitor, they may delay a little. That's great. Yes, that model, they can go very fast, even CVS. They can open 100 stores per month. With mini mart 20 store or 50 stores also very fast because now they produce, manufacture on the shelf, the furniture and chill machine, everything already booked hundred or thousand already. Supplier also can do it very fast. Everything ready now expansion team, property team, plan now, wage position and give the FS approval, then they open within one week or within some days, very fast.

[00:46:32] How much higher is the proportion of fresh food in rural stores compared to urban stores, and how does that impact store-level gross margins in rural areas?

HPV [00:46:52]: The run of fresh food is to build your footprint traffic, so the margin is not high. For the layout occupation, it would take about, let's say, 40% of the layout for fresh food and frozen, including V&F, meat and fresh chilled. Yes, on fresh. About the sales, it is about 30-40% share of the total sales of the store. Some store even very high for example, the store at the ground floor of a building or apartment building. At that catchment, people will intend to buy a lot of fresh and ready-to-eat category, but they will go to supermarket at weekend. They will buy a lot of grocery, I mean, dry food at weekend at supermarket, but daily, they will buy fresh at the store downstairs proximity, very near the house because they want fresh every day and they cannot go to supermarket every day, so they stop by the store downstairs to buy fresh every day. That's the habit building the category and layout and the model.

[00:48:44] Do you think customers will shift their weekly grocery shopping to neighbourhood stores instead of larger supermarkets or will they use them exclusively for top-up purchases, given their success in driving footfall?

HPV [00:49:06]: That's now a very clear trend we could see for supermarket, hypermarket, they are becoming kind of a destination for weekend gathering. Customers could buy it a lot, but they also buy fresh in the weekend during their visit, but that's for the consumption of weekend only. For daily use, they still buy and buy it at the mini mart downstairs near their house. Because, first, a smaller apartment because of the price very high now in Vietnam. They don't have big fridge or storage room, so they have to divide it into many purchasing time a week and convenience store or mini mart is the best solution for them, every day fresh.

[00:50:16] Given that rural store margins are lower than average, do you expect margin expansion opportunities to materialise? How do you think major grocery operators will approach their gross margin mix for these stores?

HPV [00:50:39]: They do a combo or private label like Vincom has done. They will do their own product with their own label to try some more percent in terms of profit. Even for the fresh products like vegetable and then fruit, some items that they could pack and could keep long term, they will do their own private label. That's the first, I think, strategic action for improving margin. Secondly, they improve the management and operational cost to improve the overall margin. Also, they try and I am seeing they are doing to organise twice a year to summit, the supplier to find more supplier to find more source of the product with better price. All of those actions they are doing together, private label cost and new supplier.

[00:52:23] What percentage of the overall product mix do you expect private-label products to occupy over the next 2-3 years vs 3-5 years?

HPV [00:52:30]: I do think that that would be more and more. At the moment, less than 10%, but when they are big giant, for example, 5,000-10,000 stores, that's big enough and most of the items would be private label. There's some only hero item from Unilever or P&G or some big guys as a hero product, they keep on order, they can do everything, if you could come and see what's on the shelf of the many items is a private label already, but the sales are very small, not big enough, but that's the way even supermarket as well, they develop their own thing to gain margin.

[00:53:32] What total potential margin upside do you expect major modern grocery retailers in Vietnam to achieve?

HPV [00:53:44]: I think first of all, improved margin to compensate for the fresh as a competitive edge, they lost some in fresh and they gained some in dry and overall own private label and cost. I do think that they're aiming to get about 2-3% more in terms of final gross margin. They've already done to improve from 1.7-3%, right? They want more about 5% as final to 6%.

[00:54:30] What level of network density do you expect for new store build-outs moving forwards? Will expansion primarily focus on entering new micro-markets, or will operators also increase density within existing areas?

HPV [00:54:58]: In the tier 1 city, of course, when we say in the rural strategy does not mean that they don't open in urban. They still open in urban, but very small format, maybe two-thirds compared to rural because rural still rental is okay and there's a land, good land, big land, big house, so a little big at the rural area, but in urban smaller. If we take an example of the square metre for urban area, it would be about 80-100 square metres. In the surrounding area, in the province or tier 2 area, that would be about 200 square metre or 300 square metre. If they have that land good enough, they can do that, Bach Hoa Xanh is the guy going that strategy. We could see a very big store in the province or in the surrounding area of tier 1 city, but in the city, they are almost the same 80-100 square metre only.

[00:56:32] What level of sales cannibalisation do you expect when operators increase store density within tier 1 cities and similar catchments, rather than in new micro-markets?

HPV [00:56:50]: I think currently, with the network development strategy, they assess the cannibalisation at about 10-20%, especially in the very condensed community area because they have two stores and different strategy. For the already major store, they're asking for the YoY growth target is about 10%. When they lost about 20% for a new store open near there, so that store need to gain 30% of new customer to compensate for 20% less to get the 10% growth. The cannibalisation is about 10-20% is acceptable if they open the store next to store. Normally because of the winning model of these mini marts and CVS is convenient. Customer won't go very far from their base, so 2-3km around, even some WinMart, they open just next to each other about 300 or 400 metres only. If they got enough customer, if they got enough household, they can open within 1km, 2-3 stores. It depends on the condense of the area and they decide and they read and they accept the cannibalisation about 10-20%.

[00:59:01] Is there anything you would like to add regarding larger movements that could shape Vietnam's grocery retail industry moving forwards?

HPV [00:59:27]: Actually, there are still two or three things I would like to share more, if our clients would like to know. Firstly, we have to prepare or we have to talk about technology and digital optimisation, especially at the moment when we cut and optimise the cost of labour, we need to think about that. In rural market, digitalisation is less about customer or consumer app, but it's about back-end efficiency for stock level alert, for inventory forecasting and for loyalty programme for example, that is digital. For the breakeven and the store CAPEX and already mentioned, so just focus on the supply chain and logistics investment that, I think, is a must to survive because the after all the ending profit and margins is just some percent, but if we use the third-party delivery platform, that will kill our margin, so to think about that. The payback, let's not to be very aggressive because now competition is higher and higher. Plan for three years is acceptable. Don't try to do it at one year or 1.5 years. That will cause a lot of pressure in terms of sales and customer acquisition and marketing and maybe when you spend on CAC, customer acquisition costs or marketing too high to compete and hope that we can get more traffic, but not and then get lost with the model.

IY [01:01:40]: Okay. I appreciate. I think this is a very good point or a couple of points to finish our conversation today. Let me close here and say thank you very much for sharing your insights with us. It was a pleasure to be speaking with you.

HPV [01:01:57]: Thanks a lot.

Transcription ends at 01:02:05 of the recorded material