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2026.10.07 | TB | Financials | Intrum Spain Capital-Light Positioning

原标题：Intrum Spain – Spanish Positioning Amid Capital-light Shifts

#financials

Third Bridge · 2026-10-07

Analyst-led • 28 Sep 2026

Companies: INTRUM SE, CBT US, ACR NO, DOV IT

Iñigo Merladet (IM) Board Member at BMA Española SA

Max Harper (MH) — Third Bridge Sector Analyst

Agenda

Key Insights

Introduction

MH [00:00:02]: Welcome to Third Bridge's Interview entitled Intrum Spain – Spanish Positioning Amid Capital-light Shifts. I'm Max Harper, and I'll be facilitating today's Interview with Iñigo Merladet, former Head of NPLs, Spain at Intrum AB.

Iñigo, before we start today's Interview, please state, I agree, I disagree to following statement: You understand the definition of material non-public information and agree not to disclose any such information, or any other information which is confidential, during this Interview.

IM [00:00:35]: I agree.

MH [00:00:37]: Thank you very much, Iñigo. Please start a brief introduction to your background.

IM [00:00:42]: I've been involved on the NPL space for the last 15-16 years. First, selling NPLs globally for Banco Santander and then shifting a little bit into more the collections and hiring and doing benchmarking of different servicers. Then I shifted to Intrum, where I have been in charge of global clients. Also, I've been the Head of NPLs of Intrum in Spain and responsible for business development.

Questions

00:01:23] How has Intrum Group's shift towards an asset-light servicing model and co-investments, such as with Cerberus Capital Management, impacted its Spanish operations?

IM [00:01:43]: The main problem of Intrum is that is a company that is maybe tough to understand. Intrum is a mix of two things. It's half a fund that invests in NPLs and half a servicer. Both are completely opposite type of business. One is capital-intensive, the other is capital-light, and it's all mixed together. The problem of the fund is that it is capital-intensive and requires leverage. It's a good business with good returns and nice IRRs and stable IRRs. The servicing business, on the other hand, it's asset-light, but has thin margins. In nature, servicers typically have thin margins, among which probably the collections is one of the best because margins are not as thin as in other contact centre type of business. Of course, it requires investment in IT systems and request to handle volumes in order to be efficient and cost-effective. The thing is that people do not understand the mix of those two business. Sometimes inquire, why is it so leveraged if it's a services company and the way around. The beauty of the mix is that if you have a well-honed servicing platform is what allows Intrum to invest well because it gives them very good data points with all the granularity that you need to really do good investments.

It provides the portfolios that they acquired with good servicing and eliminates the misalignment between the servicing and the principal, which happens a lot, and that creates a lot of value. This actually works. The system is good because actually, you can see that you get consistent IRRs and they do, I don't know, 150 or more deals per year in all Europe, which are not accessible to other players. It's a great mix of two businesses, but it's a matter of balance. People think that capital thing is the answer for everything, and it's not. I do think that now being Intrum overlevered, the shift to co-investing and capital-light model is the correct move to do, but it's a matter of balance. If you do not invest that much, you're not going to earn that much money. You're just going to make what a typical services company do, which is not that high, but on the other hand, you do not require capital to invest. Now it's probably the good thing to do, but don't set too high expectations because the money is earned while investing in portfolios, not doing servicing. The question of how it affects the day-to-day operations, it doesn't. At the beginning, it took a while to adapt like always, but nothing significant.

00:05:04] Intrum is looking to broaden its investment partnerships beyond Cerberus, which is focused on southern Europe, including Spain, by finding a new partner in northern Europe. How might a new northern European partnership look compared to the Cerberus deal? What lessons has the firm learned from the Cerberus agreement, and what would it do differently when negotiating new contracts?

IM [00:05:55]: I actually think that is a great idea. One of the things that Intrum has on my opinion, maybe so cheap is that it's precisely the ability to invest. The portfolios that Intrum acquires all over Europe, which is, it depends from year to year, but 150-200 deals per year are very small, very granular, and they're not accessible for everybody. On top of that, they cannot be handled by an investor because you need to have a servicer locally to supervise it and everything. That platform is extremely valuable. Now with the deal with Cerberus, I think Brocc gets all the good part, which is the ability to invest and does not carry with most of the weight, which is to handle a servicing company with homework that's still to be done, which is to make sure that the cost base is kept down to do the IT evolutions and all that. I actually think that they should either negotiate with Cerberus or even better to open it to several investors. The terms of that agreement have to be more fair in the sense that the ones that they have now are good for Intrum but they should be able to extract more money or maybe to involve them more in the part of the servicing.

00:07:41] Why would a potential investment partner offer Intrum more favourable contract terms, given that the firm's high leverage provides investors with greater negotiating power?

IM [00:07:58]: Let's take Cerberus. I don't really care about the company itself, the fund itself, but if you think that Intrum has scarce capital and too much leverage, why don't you bring them in? Cerberus could be an additional source of capital. They would probably bring some discipline to the company in terms of cost cutting, speed of transformation of the model. At the same time, would align incentives. On the other hand, it's going to be the best way to secure a long-term agreement with servicing to deploy the capital that they need to put to work on a consistent basis in 15 different European countries and for years to come, not just for a couple of years. I think it will be a great idea for both. Now I think Cerberus has the best of the two worlds in the sense that they have the capacity to invest, but they don't carry with any of the weights. I think Intrum should be able to share that weight more evenly, keeping in mind that the servicing company, the servicing by itself is not the good-looking business. It's just what enables the good-looking business, which is investing to happen.

00:09:45] Intrum faces income headwinds in the Spanish market due to a decline in specialised markets caused by unfavourable economic conditions, such as real estate, although the sector is performing strongly in the wider economy. Can the firm offset the mismatch between NPL [non-performing loan] pipeline growth and the higher rate of run-off?

IM [00:10:19]: The quick answer is no. My view, Spanish market had something like 10x as much assets under management than they have now. Coming from the 2008 crisis, there was a huge massive amounts of both real estate secured debt. That was not a flow, but that was a stock. That stock is gone. It used to be huge. Both real estate and secured debt has almost fully disappeared. It will never disappear because there is some structural volumes that have to be in the market, but it's very, very little. On top of that, delinquency is on historical low levels in all Spanish banks. That leaves us with excess capacity and fierce competition to survive among the current players, which means that people is willing to gain business even at the cost of losing money. The question is for how long? This is the type of dynamics that happen when the market shrinks, but how long this is going to last? I think it's already lasting longer, much longer than any of us foresaw at the beginning. Why is that? Because the banks back in 2013-15, basically, most of them did a spin-off of the recovery units and they wrap it up with long-term contracts that had bad margins and they sold it to servicers. Servicers paid huge amounts of money for them.

Now the cash is still flowing at abnormal rate to the servicers, but that's ending now. They overpay upfront, but they are getting too high margins, but that's going to finish abruptly. That's why the servicers are still going on, but that's finishing this year and the last one is maybe next year, but that's it. I think it's a fantastic trap. I think it's very, very tough to overcome that slowdown of the market. The only potential exit of Intrum being the best player in terms of quality and market share and the strongest or we thought it was the strongest because they had a fantastic real estate cash machine and everything basically is to treat very well their client base, even at the expense of not making money, but they need to keep competition fast to dismantle that excess capacity in order to make money in the future. At the same time, of course, do their homework in terms of cost to try to adapt to an environment that's going to be much tougher than what they have seen until now, but I'm not sure it's going to happen. I don't know how much time they have left to do this, but I think it's the only way out.

00:13:48] How much time does Intrum have to reduce its cost base and adapt to the tougher market environment? Is this a strategy the firm will pursue?

IM [00:14:06]: I don't know. It's going to depend on the ability to cut that cost base quickly, gain market share, killing the others and be able to suffer because the environment is not going to make easy to concentrate on big margins and try to be extremely profitable. What they have to do is to grab whatever kind of business they can just to keep competition. I'm not sure they are on that phase right now.

MH [00:14:54]: Are there any signals to show any improvement in Intrum's results in the Spanish market?

IM [00:15:28]: Not really to tell you the truth. I don't see that this is happening yet. They are grabbing new clients, grabbing new business and neither doing their homework at the speed that they need to do it.

00:15:54] What signals would you look for to indicate that Intrum is turning a corner in the Spanish market?

IM [00:16:06]: It's market share, I would say the signal that you have to look for in order to see if they're going to do it well or not is if they are able to grab market share. Market share is very differentiated in Spain. One is the big banks, which is where the money is and the other one is the rest, the telco utilities and small financing companies. I would definitely be looking for that metric. The other important thing, which is not that easy to see is if they are doing their homework in terms of cost cutting. That is operations and a lot of investment and streamlining of the IT platform, which is up to now very expensive.

00:17:06] What role do JVs, such as Intrum's partnership with Cerberus, play in mitigating or worsening the headwinds the company faces in the Spanish market?

IM [00:17:23]: It's good. It actually allows to get additional servicing margin that otherwise in the current situation, they could not have tackled. It would be optimal if Intrum had limited capital to invest by themselves, that will be better, but given that that's not the real situation, having a partner like Cerberus is what allows them to tackle the investing market and get the servicing for themselves. It's very good.

00:18:07] What tailwinds are offsetting the headwinds Intrum faces in the Spanish market?

IM [00:18:26]: There are some. One is macro. The macro situation is starting to shift. In Spain, the consumer finance buy now, pay later and this type of worst profile financing is starting to grow. It has been shrinking until now, it's been stable for a while, and now it's starting to grow. That could make the total pie bigger. On the banks, you don't see that yet, but because it's usually better credits. This should be the early indicator then the cycle is starting to change. That's actually an important tailwind for Intrum. The second is AI. They have been suffering in order to low IT cost heavily for many years. In the past, they didn't do a very good job. If you remember the One Intrum project, which was a fantastic European project to just do everything in just one system, everything that didn't work. With AI, they have the opportunity to do many more things much cheaper and much quicker. On top of that, five years ago, when this Intrum break was kicked off was a nice have to do. Now it's a must. I think the changing macro and the AI and ability to allow them to do the transformation quickly are probably the two things that they have to use to change the situation.

00:20:28] You mentioned the growth of BNPL [buy now, pay later] and potentially weakening consumer finance. How can Intrum particularly capture these smaller-ticket portfolios, and will this impact its margins? Does this strategy impact its margins?

IM [00:20:55]: It does. Actually, I would say, that's one of the challenges of the sector. Most growth is coming from utilities, buy now pay later, telco, consumer finance, these type of things with very small balances. Intrum does it pretty well in some countries, like in the Nordics, in the Benelux, in France, but not in others. In what they call the special markets, Spain, Greece and Italy, they have come from servicing huge amounts of big debts for big banks. They are not prepared to service those volumes effectively. That's why they need to do their homework in terms of IT and systems because either you have a very well-honed IT systems and relying a lot on chatbots, voicebots or things like this or it's impossible to service properly those portfolios because it's not cost effective.

00:22:09] How might AI impact the attractiveness of capturing smaller-ticket portfolios for Intrum, given its potential to reduce the cost to serve?

IM [00:22:27]: I think it enables to do a lot of things, but AI is available for everybody. You need to be able to put that to work quick in the market. Otherwise, somebody else is going to take your spot, but AI, just if you think on the interaction with debtor, the ability to self-serve themselves through chatbots and voicebots is fantastic. One of the biggest numbers in terms of cost for Intrum is contact centre positions. In some cases, you will need a human contact for sure, but if you are able to get rid of half of that, the saving is fantastic. On the other hand, servicers are huge databases. They have a lot of contact points with debtors. They need to understand their behaviour to think where they should put their focus on, what type of agreements they want to offer them, try to understand their behaviour and a lot of things is to understand why debtor cannot pay. Up to now, it's been tough to understand and you would extract general rules to dictate policies to be implemented. Now with AI, you can do tailor-made solutions for each of the debtors that is calling you on the spot. Actually, well used, it could be fantastic. It could be fantastic. The first or the first ones who are able to use that properly is going to be a completely new game on the market.

00:24:40] According to Intrum Justitia, the European market for serviceable debt volumes is expected to grow at 3% per annum, reaching EUR 18.1bn by 2030. Where might Intrum capture these volumes from? How does the bidding process for portfolios work?

IM [00:25:03]: On the market to be serviced, as we said, coming from buy now, pay later, telco consumer, the small tickets growth going to come? We said no, IT improvements and operational improvement. If you are thinking of capturing volumes to invest, not to service. It depends on the capital available for Intrum. If they're able to invest more with their own money, that would definitely help. Remember that, that's where the money is. The thing is that when you invest, you get a lot of money on the long run. On the short run, it's not that visible. It requires capital, but the business plans with this type of portfolio is usually done at 10 or 15 years. If they have with this capital raise more capital to play with or even they had additional capital, it's good news for Intrum because they could put it to work, which they do particularly well.

MH [00:26:23]: Do prospective sellers view Intrum's co-investment structure differently from that of a traditional debt collection agency? What role does this play in the firm's ability to capture volumes?

IM [00:26:39]: I don't think that's an issue. The base is always Intrum and the day-to-day is with Intrum. They don't really care if Cerberus is behind or not. I don't think that's an issue at all.

00:26:58] How might Intrum's blended IRRs evolve from the 19% reported in Q2 2026, given the firm's shifting portfolio dynamics?

IM [00:27:07]: IRRs are incredibly consistent. Once again, that's the beauty of Intrum. They're incredibly consistent because of three things. First, because of price discipline. They have been in business for a long time, and they have access to all portfolios trading in all the geographies, and they only go for it if it really makes sense in terms of pricing. First pick, buy cheap or not buy cheap, but buy at a fair price. Don't screw up buying too expensive. The second thing is diversification. They do 150 deals per year. That's a lot. That means that if they screw in one, nothing happens because there are many, many of them. That also nurtures the machinery for the future because it gives them more data points and they know how to behave and they know how to do the onboardings and everything. They have very long business plans. Why is that? They buy a little bit of everything, but they love and they tend to buy very old portfolios. Very old portfolios are cheap in terms of money, but they also are extremely stable because most of them are heavily legalised and money keeps going from the courts, no matter what you do. They are very, very stable. I don't see IRRs, of course, can move a little bit because of the macro and everything, but they're very, very stable. As an investor, it's something that I would not be too worried about.

00:29:21] Intrum is taking actions to boost IRRs through an AI-driven transformation plan vs targeting a 35-40% reduction in FTE [full-time equivalent] costs over the next three years. How effective might this investment be? Where do you think the firm stands in the AI roll-out race?

IM [00:29:52]: That's really where the make or break moment is. If they are able to execute it well, which is far from easy, it could be a real success. They could put the company back on track to become a great company again. If they fail to do so, competition could quickly leave them behind. It really depends on how well they execute. The key in any case is that whatever they do, they cannot harm their client base. Their client base is not that big. Of the market is not that big in the sense that there are not that many banks, not that many financial companies, not that many telcos. What is important is to really care for your clients in the transition. If for whatever you do, you deliver a poor service to your clients with the level of competition that is in the market, you are dead. The thing is that they need to transform quickly, which is not easy. At the same time, be sure that has not negative impacts on their clients.

MH [00:31:16]: What impact might this have on Intrum's returns?

IM [00:31:25]: It could be fantastic, not on the revenue side, but on the cost side. What is driving that these days, all servicers is labour cost and IT cost. It could have a very, very relevant change on the numbers, but I don't think it's going to be fantastic on revenue increase, but on cost reduction, more than anything.

00:32:31] If all of Intrum's competitors are rolling out AI, how can the firm preserve its margin and OPEX gains, assuming competitive dynamics remain unchanged?

IM [00:32:53]: There is not room for all players in the market right now. There are too many. Either you are competitive and that has to go through AI implementation or you are dead, there's no room for you. The new players have one important advantage, which is their cost base is slim. On the other hand, they do not have access to the big clients. That's what Intrum has. I think they should leverage on that and run because otherwise, that advantage to have access to all the important clients and it's not something minor because telcos and utilities, okay, but banks are very tough to access and Cerberus have access to their private data of their clients. You really have to have the confidence and the IT approvals and everything to have those clients, but that's an advantage that last some time, it's not forever. They need to do their homework on that. While benefiting from that advantage otherwise, they are there.

00:34:26] Do you anticipate consolidation or expect funds to go under, given the fragmented Spanish market?

IM [00:34:44]: It from market to market. In Spain, there has been a strong consolidation. Finsolutia has merged with Hipoges and Servihabitat. There has been many talks on the market to merge many other companies, but something has to happen because there's not enough paper for everybody to work on. I would say that half of the players is going to disappear either by acquisition/merge or because they are going to run out of business, but it's going to be pretty quick, not that many time to feed that many players in the market.

00:35:39] Which players might emerge as winners vs losers in the Spanish market? What will be the reasons for failure?

IM [00:35:52]: Two big levers to win. One is to be able to operate at a low-cost base. That's the biggest strength. The second one is to have hold of the bigger clients, which is where the scarce market share is. It's going to be a battle between those two. If you ask me five years ago, Intrum was very well-positioned because they had most of the Spanish bigger clients, had a disproportionate share. They had that advantage to do their homework in terms of cost and IT transformation in order to secure that market. Intrum has not done their homework in the last 3-4 years. Do they still have the time to do it? I'm not sure. If a new player comes in or one of the current players with a really much thinner cost base and they do a good job. It's a matter of time that the traditional clients are going to be open to do business with them. It's not clear, but it's going to be depending on how quick can the incumbent players move towards a completely different cost structure because the market that they used to and the margins that they used to manage are not there anymore, and they will never be again.

00:37:38] Intrum's collections remain above active forecast at 102% over the past 12 months, which is down 1% QoQ. What is your outlook for collections? Can the firm maintain performance above forecast?

IM [00:38:04]: In general, when macro situation worsens, which is what could happen in the next quarters, collections go down, basically maintaining the same cost because people are not able to pay with the at the same rate than before. That harms margins at first, but then volumes start to expand and eventually, collections recover and come back. It may have a bet, but total margin in the end usually is better. That means that it could be good for Intrum, not at the beginning, but in, I don't know, 12-24 months horizon, it should be good for Intrum, but if you are thinking about Intrum's own portfolios specifically, once again, it's not a concern because they are extremely stable. That has to do because they are highly legalised and a huge portion of the income derives from consistent cash coming from courts. It's not a big concern for me.

00:39:40] Intrum recently addressed its leverage issues through a SEK 7.5bn capital raise and a SEK 2.4bn portfolio sale, prompting Moody's and S&P to improve its ratings to B3 and B-. Q2 2026 pro forma leverage now stands at 4.3x, down from 6.2x over the last 12 months. What is your assessment of the debt situation? Is the firm finally turning a corner, or does it have more road to run?

IM [00:40:17]: The situation is, it has been a huge problem for Intrum and actually has prevented somehow to look for the long run. I think it is indeed a very important milestone. The recapitalisation of Intrum should let them work more focused on what they have to do, which is the long term. Is it turning a corner? I think, yes, but there are still a lot of things to do. It looks like they have a plan, but now it requires a precise execution of that plan of that IT transformation, of that operational change and has many risks threatening from all different directions from competition, from speed of implementation and a macro situation, which is not that easy for the moment. With still the company with a lot of debt, it's not easy. It's going to depend. It is a turning point, yes, but it requires business execution from them for the following months.

00:41:46] Following the capital raise, Intrum's share price took a hit and it exhausted much of its goodwill for future equity injections. What non-organic levers remain for the firm to reduce its leverage, given debt holders also took a hit following the restructuring?

IM [00:42:09]: The only one that I can think of is the one that we commented a while ago, which is they have given away their biggest asset for little money. The biggest asset is not a servicing company. It's the ability to invest well and service consistently all acquired portfolios. I think the other lever that they have is, bring an investor in, but not for co-investing only, but they should force them to enter on the capital structure. It's a win-win. Not a general private equity type of guy, but a specialised debt fund on board could give them cash and lower the leverage, but also money to invest, impose them cost discipline, transformation speed and expert eyes on the market. I think it's the lever that they still can pull and actually think it's a good one.

00:43:39] What level of leverage would you see as being sustainable for Intrum going forwards? Is the firm’s 4.3x pro forma leverage sustainable or would you like to see more improvement there?

IM [00:44:11]: The metric sounds reasonable, but the metric is wrong. Servicing business does not require debt. Most business alike, all the contact centre or pure services business have 1-2x debt. What requires debt is the investing business. As such, the target should be based on the size of their investing book and not on how much servicing margin they earn. I don't have a criteria because I think the metric is not correct. They should talk about loan-to-value market on the investing book and maybe leaving aside, I don't know, 1x debt on the servicing revenue, but nothing more than that. How that translates to the overall metric? Not sure. It's going to depend on the size of their book and their book is shrinking. If they're able to expand their investing book, they could take on more leverage, why not?

MH [00:45:55]: How should Intrum balance expanding its investment book through additional leverage against potential interest rate rises, which could make debt more expensive? What constitutes a reasonable leverage level?

IM [00:46:19]: Once again, in terms of loan-to-value, I would say a 40% debt to related to the value of the whole book is a good metric. Why not? If they are below that rate, I don't care if they get more debt in order to get good projects. If they have, I don't know, a 7% cost of debt and a 19% IRR, I would take all the debt that I can if there are enough good projects to tackle.

00:47:00] Would debt holders be willing to provide Intrum with more leverage, given the firm's recent restructuring?

IM [00:47:13]: That's the point. Probably investors would not like the idea, but because I think they are not looking at the proper numbers. It's going back to the beginning, it's because of this mix of businesses. You should look at Intrum as an investment fund, not a servicing company. If you look at this way, the servicing is just an instrument in order to be able to invest, by the way, which is where the money comes from. I think they're looking at the wrong metrics. If you really believe the value of their book and the debt is 40% of that, and they get 19% return vs a cost of, I don't know, 6-7% of the leverage. The more the better, the more the better. The problem is that investors are thinking this is a services company, and it looks extremely overlevered, but five years ago, it was not. Now with the investment book shrinking and shrinking is not that well-positioned, but we will need to run the numbers and to see what is the loan-to-value, not the number of debt of leverage vs the EBITDA of the servicing business.

00:48:45] Can Intrum successfully deleverage organically by boosting margins through AI?

IM [00:49:10]: It's going to be extremely difficult. Income in most markets is tough to increase income is tough because there's a lot of healthy competition in most markets and fierce in others. It all depends on their ability to perform better and at a lower cost. I think that to do something in the short run sounds ambitious. You will have to wait and you have to invest, which is what they do best and where the money is.

00:49:53] Intrum is targeting a 3x servicing leverage ratio by 2030, down from its current 4.3x. Do you think that the firm could achieve this goal, and if not, why?

IM [00:50:14]: It sounds ambitious, but once again, if they do reach that goal by shrinking their investment book, it's not good. I don't think they should be focused on that ratio, but from my point of view, sounds ambitious, yes.

00:50:40] What impact are Intrum's high leverage and deleveraging efforts having on its competitive positioning?

IM [00:50:54]: It should have none unless they force it otherwise. If they start looking to get quick wins instead of caring for their client base and do their homework in terms of IT and ops streamlining, they can lose the train. That is why the key is to keep the company focused on delivering best-of-class service because while they give best-of-class service, they are buying time in order to do their homework. If they, given the urgency to deliver, fail to take care of the clients, that's going to harm them a lot.

00:52:00] Have the issues faced by firms such as Intrum and Lowell allowed new entrants to capture market share? How can incumbent players defend their market position?

IM [00:52:17]: Competition from newcomers is fierce. Although the incumbents have some advantages. They have the brand, they have the client confidence. They have long-term relations, which is pretty important, long-term contracts. They have IT interfaces with the more important clients. They have passed the compliance requirements, which are not easy either. They have many advantages over new players. That's their hold in the market, but they need to do their homework before the other ones pass those barriers and start being trustworthy competitors.

00:53:27] Who are the new players entering the Spanish market? Are any of them leveraging AI more effectively than Intrum?

IM [00:53:40]: The newcomer in Spain is Pair Finance. I hear that they have a very well-honed AI automatic platform. Intrum has one of fellows and there are others on the market, but none of them is actually a well-rounded product. There's going to be a battle, but there are many niche players, but still, I mean, they have not penetrated the market properly to acquire a relevant position and being the champion of the market based on the AI capabilities. There is still game there.

00:54:38] What are the top 2-3 factors institutional investors should monitor regarding Intrum over the next 1-2 years?

IM [00:54:55]: The things that I would monitor is NPL client base and market share, not that they earn money or not, but if they are servicing more clients or not. I say NPL because you should take aside the markets that are going to be discontinued like real estate. The other one that I would monitor is the pace at which they achieve that cost reduction and IT transformation plan, which is going to be important. That's going to be what enables them to tackle small balances in an effective manner. Otherwise, the growth of the market, they're not going to be able to capture it. More generally, the ability to broaden the capital partnership to other players, which I think it will be healthy and also to renegotiate it wisely. They have one beautiful capability, which is able to invest and service properly portfolios. They have one place where they need some help, which is in the servicing business. Being able to broaden their capital partnership and bring in those partners into the capital structure, I think it will be very, very helpful.

MH [00:56:38]: Is there anything else you want to highlight?

IM [00:56:45]: No, I think we discussed basically everything. Just in a nutshell, I think there are a lot of challenges, but Intrum is probably the greatest servicer of the world. They have the materials. Now they need to execute properly and do it quickly because otherwise, they are running out of time.

MH [00:57:16]: Great. We'll now end the Interview. Let me close by saying thank you very much for your input and goodbye.

Transcription ends at 00:57:23 of the recorded material