2026.10.09 | GP | Consumer | Amer Sports Salomon Growth Outlook

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Viewpoint:

Industry Consultant

Moderator: Alfred Shen (AS)

Bo Li (BL), General Manager of the East China Branch - Beijing Sanfo Outdoor Products

SUMMARY

Overview

The discussion examined Salomon’s rapid expansion in China, led by footwear, store openings, wider online distribution, and strong brand marketing under Anta. The expert described Salomon as a globally diversified outdoor and ski brand that is positioned in China primarily as a fashionable trail-running footwear label.

Growth remains strong despite some seasonal slowing. Expansion into lower-tier cities is increasing the importance of accessible price bands. Apparel and skiing represent longer-term opportunities, but footwear and store rollout remain the immediate priorities.

Key Insights

The expert expects overall sales momentum to remain strong because planned stores, leases, and inventory are already largely secured. Products below RMB900 are the main growth driver, reflecting Salomon’s expansion beyond major cities. Footwear contributes most sales, while apparel is being developed gradually through localized Chinese design and production. Salomon’s mountain credibility is a major advantage, but its shoes are comparatively narrow, firm, and less suitable for urban commuting. This could become a risk if fashion demand weakens. Gravel-running promotion has limited practical relevance in China but was viewed as effective marketing that reinforces technical credibility. Apparel currently lacks strong product differentiation. Its growth depends heavily on converting existing footwear customers. Skiing is strategically important for winter demand and global brand consistency, although China’s ski market is currently contracting. The long-term per-store revenue ambition was considered extremely difficult and potentially dependent on eventually reducing store count while improving productivity.

Competitive Landscape

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Brand or group

Positioning and implications

Salomon

Strong technical heritage, fashion appeal, collaborations, and marketing; weaker urban comfort and apparel differentiation

HOKA and KAILAS

Principal external competitors in trail running and technical outdoor footwear

On

Major competitor in fashionable athletic footwear, with stronger commuting comfort

Arc’teryx, KOLON SPORT, Descente

Internal portfolio competitors with overlapping customers, pricing, and footwear capabilities

ASICS and Mizuno

Strong road-running specialists that previously limited Salomon’s success in that category

The North Face and Goldwin

Stronger fashion and apparel positioning

Mammut and Haglöfs

More credible in technical mountain apparel, generally at higher prices

Quantitative Insights

Metric

Expert assessment

January–September sales growth

Approximately 40%, described as very strong

Q3 sales growth

Approximately 35%, reflecting seasonal slowing

China stores

About 225 in 2025; more than 300 in 2026; target near 500

Sales mix

Footwear 85%; apparel 15%

Footwear price mix

Below RMB900 at least 70%; RMB900–1,100 about 20%; above RMB1,200 about 10%

Average transaction value

Around RMB1,100

Footwear attachment rate

About 1.5 items

Recent same-store growth

Approximately 25%, considered impressive

Repeat purchase rate

Above 50%, viewed as top-tier

Outlet support

Roughly one outlet per eight full-price stores at scale

Store sales range

Approximately RMB6 million to above RMB25 million annually

Apparel pricing

Spring and summer RMB400–1,200; winter RMB800 to above RMB2,000

10/11/2026 at 11:36 AM UTC

AS: Hello, everyone. I am Alfred, senior analyst at Guidepoint Insights. Today, we are honored to have a veteran sportswear-industry expert, Mr. Li, share the latest developments, strategies, and outlook for Salomon. Before we begin the Q&A, Mr. Li, please briefly introduce yourself.

BL: Good evening. I have followed Salomon and been responsible for its sales for more than 20 years, so I know its growth, development data, and success factors relatively well. I hope we have an enjoyable discussion tonight. Thank you.

AS: Thank you. Based on your estimates, how did Salomon's overall China sales grow in Q3 and from October to date? Was there a major difference between online and offline growth? If so, why?

BL: The difference was not large. From January through September, the sales data we observed showed average growth of about 40%. Even five years after Amer Sports was acquired, Salomon is still growing very rapidly. The biggest advantages come from Anta Group's brand building and broader channel expansion. It had about 225 stores in 2025 and more than 300 by now in 2026. Growth comes both from the year-on-year increase in store count and the absolute sales contribution of new stores. Online and offline growth rates are roughly similar, with both growing rapidly, though online is slightly faster because it has expanded beyond Tmall and JD.com. Salomon has also built a fairly complete Douyin sales matrix, plus some other peripheral channels.

AS: That was January to September. Looking only at Q3, did growth slow versus the first half, or remain around 40%?

BL: Q3 growth slowed somewhat. Growth across sports and outdoor categories is generally weaker in Q3. One reason is the lower average selling price per item. Winter and spring feature waterproof products and heavier hiking products with higher unit prices, while Q3 focuses on lighter, breathable products with lower prices. So Q3 slows, but this does not affect strong full-year growth.

AS: What was Q3 year-on-year growth?

BL: About five percentage points lower, roughly 35%.

AS: So not much lower.

BL: Correct. Overall brand growth remains strong.

AS: Looking at Q3 by product line, such as hiking, running, trail running, road running, S/LAB, recovery shoes, and XT, how did they compare?

BL: Yes, you know the product lines very well. Sorry, it seems you had not finished your question.

AS: I simply want to know whether performance differed materially by line, which performed especially well, and which were unremarkable.

BL: Globally and in Europe, Salomon is a full-category outdoor brand covering mountaineering, hiking, skiing, running, and trail running. When it entered China in 2004, its range was considered too broad for brand development, so it focused on trail running. In China, it became like CK, which consumers think of mainly as underwear rather than a huge denim brand. In Europe and France, Salomon is considered a full-category brand, but in China it is seen as a footwear, trail-running, and trail-running-meets-fashion brand, not a complete outdoor brand. Therefore, further subdividing its categories is not especially meaningful.

The XT line you mentioned was the first blockbuster marketed by Anta around 2020, after Anta acquired Amer Sports

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in 2019 and gained Salomon. XT was among Salomon's most hardcore, trail-oriented products, priced at RMB1,680-1,780, near the top of the athletic-shoe market. Today, footwear contributes about 85% of Salomon's China sales and apparel 15%. As footwear sales grew, category segmentation became less important than price. The strategy moved clearly down-market, from RMB1,780 to RMB1,280, then RMB980, and now RMB780. This is a normal scale effect: lower prices reach more consumers and purchasing power, enabling faster sales expansion.

Salomon's lines are actually extremely detailed: hard-ground, sandy, and muddy trail running; ordinary road and marathon running; hiking; heavy and light hiking; casual and fashion footwear; and water shoes. But other international running and trail brands also segment their ranges this finely.

AS: So in China, looking at Salomon shoe series is less meaningful than looking at price bands?

BL: It has no meaning. Store customers are not buying for a specific outdoor use, such as a 300-kilometer race mainly on grass. True professional trail runners more often use brands such as KAILAS and HOKA. Salomon has become rare in the core professional trail-running segment.

AS: By price band, which grew fastest in Q3?

BL: Below RMB900 was fastest and represented at least 70% of sales. RMB900-1,100 represented about 20%, and above RMB1,200 about 10%. This also shows that, with more than 300 stores, Salomon has penetrated third-tier cities such as Zhumadian in Henan and Tongling. Stores in such cities need products in this price band. Even RMB800 is a substantial outlay there for athletic shoes.

AS: Apparel accounts for about 15% of sales. Through 2026 to date, has this share kept rising or fluctuated around 15%?

BL: It has been rising slowly. First, Salomon is inherently a full-category outdoor brand. In Europe it leans toward skiing and has a very strong alpine-ski line underpinning its brand stature and professionalism, alongside trail-running footwear and mountaineering and hiking lines. Developing apparel in China is consistent with its global positioning. As China's contribution rises, the business wants to align with global brand values. Second, footwear has limits in addressable channels and marketing strategies. Apparel must expand to provide longer-term growth.

AS: How is apparel positioned in assortment, structure, launches, and pricing? Could these strategies change in 2027?

BL: We have observed Salomon for a long time. Before Anta acquired Amer Sports, apparel was selected from France's international line. After 2019, Fila's team became more involved. But Fila declined over the prior two years while Salomon grew rapidly, so the strategy entered a third phase: Korean-channel products. Given Salomon's growth in Korea and geographic proximity, the Korean line seemed promising. After nearly two years of testing, it still did not work well; Korean aesthetics and design did not sufficiently understand Chinese customers.

Starting in early 2026, Salomon brought overall apparel strategy back to China for local design, production, and R&D. The two main directions are trail running and skiing, areas familiar to Salomon and supported by strong global and Chinese reputations. Pricing is relatively flexible: trail-running products are lighter, while ski products skew to autumn and winter. Overall positioning is slightly above mid-market, around The North Face, clearly below Arc'teryx, and slightly below KOLON SPORT and Descente. Mainstream spring/summer apparel is roughly RMB400-1,200; winter apparel roughly RMB800 to above RMB2,000. Professional ski suits can cost RMB3,000-4,000, but they are not major sellers.

Salomon's current China store target is around 500. After reaching that number, it may enter a second image-

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upgrade and channel-adjustment phase, with richer apparel lines and larger stores. Average stores are now about 150 square meters; future stores may be around 400 square meters, providing enough space for more apparel and further sales growth.

AS: Is the apparel strategy stable and mature, or could 2027 bring major changes, new directions beyond skiing and trail running, or higher price bands?

BL: Major change is unlikely. Salomon plans 500 China stores and has completed only 300. Until it reaches 500, footwear will remain the most important contributor, and it will not shift enormous time, effort, and marketing support to apparel. Apparel is being cultivated, while footwear is core. Changes in 2026, 2027, and even 2028 should be limited. Apparel is 15% now and probably will not exceed 30% before 2028; 30% would already be an extreme. Anta's phased goals and brand control are clear.

Also, "outdoor" has become shorthand for premium, fashionable, street-oriented, and functional. Salomon's Chinese outdoor market is not the same as in France, Europe, or the US. About 95% of its core customers do not go into the mountains or engage in real outdoor activities. Whether products are positioned around skiing or trail running, they influence ordinary middle-class and young fashion consumers. Line expansion must serve the overall business.

AS: Management discussed an all-terrain running shift at its September investor day, including the gravel scenario, and held a second gravel-running event in China this year. Is gravel part of the hard, sandy, and muddy trail categories, or a new scenario? Since price bands may matter more than scenarios in China, how do you assess this strategy?

BL: In practical terms, it is not very meaningful. Gravel is a dedicated category within trail-running shoes at many brands, but gravel terrain is relatively uncommon in China's mountains. As event marketing, however, it is interesting. To outdoor professionals, it is an ordinary scenario covered by every trail-running brand. Its value lies in showing that the marketing team understands the product and can capture consumer pain points or hot topics.

Marketing should avoid grand but empty claims such as being the world's most professional, best-selling, trendiest, or best-looking trail brand. Such claims rarely leave a clear impression. Salomon instead finds a specific gravel characteristic and markets around it, leaving consumers with the impression that Salomon is professional. All Chinese outdoor brands are trying to retain their outdoor genes and professional DNA. An outdoor brand's culture should remain rooted in the mountains. From the perspectives of professionalism, brand DNA, and using one point to trigger consumer awareness, this is successful. It may have little practical significance, but it is interesting. Outsiders find it impressive; insiders recognize it as a decades-old industry idea packaged effectively, like marketing a car specifically on quietness when noise and vibration are standard evaluation criteria.

AS: How do you assess the running-shoe portfolio's scenario coverage and SKU depth and breadth, including mud, hard ground, marathon, and ordinary road running? What needs improvement, and what strengths are hard to surpass?

BL: Salomon is a genuinely professional outdoor brand. Its situation is the reverse of On, HOKA, Altra, Brooks, ASICS, or Mizuno. Those brands keep pursuing mountain credibility through races and tests to demonstrate professional outdoor genes. Salomon need not prove that because it has long been among the most professional. Its challenge is improving comfort for urban wear.

Brands originating in cities already perform well in softness, grip, and on-foot comfort, and seek mountain capabilities such as traction, shock absorption, ankle protection, and carbon plates. Salomon already has those professional attributes, but it must focus on how its core consumers feel wearing the shoes. This remains weak across its range.

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Salomon excels at shoes for running in mountains, but they are less soft and comfortable for offices, commuting, and roads.

Young consumers who paid premiums for XT-6 may find them narrow and hard. They look stylish, like expensive high heels, but are not comfortable. In an office they can also feel slippery because they were designed for mountains, mud, sand, and wet ground. If fashion momentum declines, consumers can easily switch because the shoe experience is not friendly for urban use. By comparison, shoes from Lululemon, HOKA, and On are much more suitable for commuting: light, soft, and also decent for running.

AS: Under management's all-terrain running strategy, where could Salomon expand or improve in function, sports scenarios, design, or other areas?

BL: Before 2019, Amer Sports believed the mountain business was limited because China had only about 500,000 running participants, while road running had a much broader population. It promoted road-running products for two or three years, but failed because Salomon was still a niche outdoor brand and could not compete with specialist road-running brands such as ASICS and Mizuno. From today's perspective, expanding into genuine road running while retaining distinctive design could still offer a larger opportunity.

AS: So strengthen road running.

BL: Since Anta took over, Salomon has essentially abandoned road-running shoes. It now has only trail-running shoes and hiking shoes. Road running is the truly mass, lower-priced category with more footwear growth potential. But Salomon also has broad apparel options. It can keep footwear professional and outdoor-focused, while seeking remaining growth from apparel. Between apparel expansion and shoe expansion, I believe apparel will contribute more sales growth.

AS: On competition, some say HOKA is Salomon's largest trail-running competitor in China and KAILAS its hiking competitor. Do you agree? Who else poses a threat? If Salomon develops road running, which competitors could affect it most?

BL: Viewed from an outdoor foundation, there are many competitors, including internal ones. Within Anta, Salomon mainly competes with Arc'teryx, KOLON SPORT, and Descente because their footwear positioning, pricing, and even production lines are similar. Arc'teryx footwear only launched around 2019 and was initially benchmarked to Salomon pricing. For four or five years, their prices overlapped heavily, and some Arc'teryx shoes were even cheaper. Arc'teryx then moved upscale quickly and raised footwear prices, creating some separation, though customer overlap remains. Internal footwear competition is still intense.

Externally, HOKA and KAILAS are the main trail-running competitors; On is the main fashion-sports competitor. Yet Salomon's strong marketing, collaborations, and work with trendsetters mean sales are driven more by customer attraction than by taking share directly from competitors. Outdoor athletic footwear remains a broad blue-ocean market. A decline at Salomon does not automatically mean an increase at On or HOKA. Each brand can grow on its own efforts.

AS: What about apparel competitiveness?

BL: Apparel has little competitiveness or differentiation. In mountain professionalism, it cannot match Mammut, Haglöfs, or Arc'teryx, though those brands cost more, leaving Salomon some room. In fashion, trends, and marketing, it is also weaker than The North Face and Goldwin. What can save Salomon apparel is the overall brand's marketing power. The core of future apparel growth is footwear: about 80% of apparel buyers have already bought Salomon

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shoes.

The growth cycle is clear. First, footwear opens a broad market. Then apparel and larger stores capture another round of spending from prior footwear customers, becoming the second growth curve. A third stage may involve sales declining and returning to core products and competitiveness before renewed marketing. The first ceiling arrives when 500 stores are filled; the second when apparel exceeds 40% of sales.

AS: What is Salomon's current position in winter sports equipment in China, including assortment and pricing? What may be its future development plan?

BL: Salomon places enormous importance on winter products. Negatively, its main footwear sales are concentrated in spring and summer. Trail running is a spring/summer activity, and lightweight fashion shoes lack warmth for northern winters. It therefore must strengthen autumn/winter products.

Globally and in France and Europe, winter is Salomon's strongest business because of skiing. It sells ski hardware, skis, boots, helmets, goggles, and complete ski outfits. One ski setup can equal the spending on ten trail-running outfits. The company wants to bring this strength to China, both to reverse autumn/winter weakness and to reinforce its full-category brand power.

Across Amer Sports, there is strong emphasis on growing Salomon winter skiing. Amer Sports will open independent ski stores under the Amer Sports name. Salomon products will also have stand-alone stores at ski resorts, and the brand may sponsor resort consumers to use its products. Ski products are therefore a strategically important autumn/winter line and sales source.

AS: Do consumers accept these products, and are the assortment, pricing, and entry point reasonable and effective?

BL: Strategically and long term, it is very reasonable because Salomon is fundamentally a ski brand in Europe and worldwide. It still has a major card not fully played, giving the brand growth resilience. In reality, however, it is painful because China's ski boom has passed. Its peak was before the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and the ski market and consumer base are now contracting. Anta completed the acquisition in 2019 and truly took over operations in 2020; by the time it got moving, the Olympic boom was ending. Short-term impact will therefore be limited, though the long-term direction is right.

Footwear is still growing well, so the company can be patient and build a presence. Winter and ski products are intended eventually to support growth if fashionable footwear declines. This is clearly strategic preparation.

AS: So it has more patience.

BL: Yes. Footwear growth has clearly not peaked. There are two steps before skiing needs to accelerate: reach 500 footwear stores, then raise apparel from 15% to 40% of sales. Skiing can still be pushed after those are exhausted.

AS: Management said at the September investor day that the average selling price of Salomon apparel in China had risen. Which items increased, by how much, and what is the logic?

BL: Apparel itself did not increase in price. Prices remained stable. The average rose because of vertical category expansion. Previously, Salomon mainly sold familiar items such as T-shirts, shorts, and sportswear, at perhaps RMB500, RMB800, and RMB1,600. With greater influence, a larger fan base, and more investment, stores now easily sell RMB2,000 products. Sales and average unit prices rise because the assortment includes more expensive categories, not because existing items were repriced. It is like Audi adding A8 and Q7 models alongside A4 and A6. The original RMB400 T-shirt and RMB900 hoodie still cost the same.

10/11/2026 at 11:36 AM UTC

AS: Have you seen list-price increases in running shoes, or new shoes with higher average launch prices?

BL: No. It is the opposite.

AS: Prices are still falling?

BL: Shoes are also adding new and expensive models, but mainstream selling prices are being reduced.

AS: Has the mainstream new-product price stabilized, or could it fall again next year?

BL: It is relatively stable and cannot fall much further. Price reduction can mean an item is directly priced at RMB880, or that a RMB980 item is sold at 20% off for RMB840. Salomon's current approach is healthier: an RMB880 shoe sells for RMB880 and a RMB980 shoe for RMB980, rather than discounting RMB980 to RMB840. This leaves the brand the future option of offering discounts and preserves market control and growth reserves.

AS: Has the discount strategy for products one year or more out of season changed versus 2025? Are discounts narrowing in 2026?

BL: No material change. The brand is still growing rapidly, core products remain in short supply, and more stores and orders absorb inventory. It is in an extensive growth phase with insufficient rather than excessive stock. Discount control and outlet terms remain normal.

AS: So it need not narrow discounts, for example from 20% off in 2025 to only 10% off in 2026?

BL: If there is no stock, there is no need.

AS: I mean, because products sell so well, could one-year-old merchandise move from 20% off to only 10% off?

BL: No.

AS: So there is no need?

BL: Correct. It can save that move for later.

AS: Sorry, I did not hear you.

BL: Overall discounts remain very stable. They do not want to reduce discount depth and make consumers think prices are rising, nor deepen discounts because there is no excess inventory to clear.

AS: You mentioned the goal of 500 stores, versus more than 300 now. If another 200 open, how many outlet stores might be needed for past-season products?

BL: Relative to what store base?

AS: If 200 regular stores are added, existing outlets may not absorb the additional volume.

BL: Correct. More outlets will definitely be needed.

AS: What supporting ratio would be appropriate?

BL: In core cities, roughly five regular stores to one outlet. At around 500 stores overall, roughly eight to one.

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AS: Eight to one overall.

BL: One outlet or discount store for every eight full-price stores.

AS: That is still high, meaning dozens of outlets at 500 stores.

BL: It is normal. For a brand confined to first-tier cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, rather than provincial capitals, the ratio is about five to one. As it expands into second- and third-tier cities and gains scale, the ratio falls to around eight to one.

AS: For Q3, what are your estimates for store traffic, transaction value, attachment rate, and same-store sales?

BL: Average transaction value is around RMB1,100, covering roughly 80% of sales. Traffic depends on each shopping center's ability to attract visitors. Core Salomon stores still rely on their malls' traffic. Based on sales growth, brand traffic is also growing well. For footwear, the attachment rate is a normal roughly 1.5, meaning two customers buy three pairs. For an overall outdoor brand, however, Salomon's rate is weak because it has little apparel. Arc'teryx, Patagonia, and Marmot can approach 2.2-2.5. At 2.5, two customers buy five items. Traffic growth is not a major concern, but same-store growth will face challenges because footwear trends change quickly and there is limited scope to adjust a shoe for fashion.

AS: From Q3 to date, did old-store same-store sales grow or decline?

BL: They grew about 25% year on year. Overall growth includes both same-store growth and scale growth from new stores.

AS: Twenty-five percent is quite good.

BL: Reasonable. Outdoor demand remains strong across brands. Salomon's 25% is particularly impressive because its total scale is already substantial.

AS: What is your outlook for Q4 and first-half 2027 same-store sales, transaction value, and attachment?

BL: Maintaining 30% growth should be no problem.

AS: Thirty percent same-store growth?

BL: Demand from shopping centers for new Salomon stores remains very high. Like Adidas and Nike in the past, it could theoretically enter 2,000 malls across China, but Salomon remains restrained and has set a clear ceiling of 500.

AS: Do you mean around 30% same-store growth in both Q4 and first-half 2027?

BL: Yes. It has grown rapidly for five consecutive years and remains some distance from its target. Moving from 300 to 500 stores leaves substantial growth. Pricing and discounts are stable. Even after reaching 500 stores, it retains another lever: discounting. The strategy and growth curve resemble Fila's.

AS: So transaction value and attachment should not change much in Q4 or first-half 2027.

BL: No fundamental change. They may move two or three percentage points, which is not meaningful. If apparel keeps increasing, future average unit value may rise.

AS: What annual revenue ranges do strong and average Salomon stores achieve in China? Is the gap large?

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BL: Very large. For example, the Wuxi MixC store generates around RMB6 million annually, while the Shanghai Xintiandi store exceeds RMB25 million.

AS: Management said average annual revenue per store should exceed US$4 million by 2031. Is that reasonable or achievable?

BL: US$4 million is about RMB25 million. That is very difficult. You said 2031?

AS: Yes, I believe they said 2031.

BL: It is probably a strategic target. At that level, Salomon sales would exceed RMB10 billion. The figure is reverse- engineered from the RMB10 billion target, so whether it is reasonable is less important than the need to derive that sales total. Four hundred stores averaging RMB25 million equals RMB10 billion. At that point, it may pursue contractionary growth, as Arc'teryx did earlier: reduce 500 stores to 400 while raising average revenue above RMB25 million.

AS: Does Salomon favor male or female target customers in resource and spending allocation?

BL: No. Marketing does not favor either. The focus is young people, and youth, fashion, and trends are often gender- neutral.

AS: What is Salomon's member repeat-purchase rate, and how does it rank?

BL: Very strong.

AS: Approximately what level?

BL: Above 50%.

AS: Top-tier?

BL: Yes. More than half of consumers own at least two pairs of Salomon shoes.

AS: One final question. If same-store growth is around 30% in Q4 and first-half 2027, could overall sales growth, including new stores, remain close to 40%?

BL: Absolutely. I do not expect much deviation. Two controllable conditions support it: the remaining market opportunity is large, and store-opening plans and inventory preparation are fixed. Internally, 40% growth has effectively already been secured because next year's planned stores have signed leases and the merchandise is ready. Once stores begin selling in the first half and goods arrive in January and February, the growth is realized. Although we discuss it as a forecast, operationally it is largely set: store contracts and products for January-June next year were finalized in July this year.

AS: That concludes today's discussion. Thank you, Mr. Li, for your time and hard work.

BL: No problem. Goodbye.

AS: Thank you. Bye.

AS: 大家好，我是Guidepoint Insights的分析师沈志峰，今天我们非常荣幸邀请到了运动服饰行业的资深专家李总，来给我们分享一下关于萨洛蒙的一些最新动态策略还有一些展望，我们正式进入问答之前，首先有请李总做个简短自我介绍，

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李总您请。BL: 大家晚上好，我跟进Salomon和负责Salomon的销售已经有20多年的时间了，所以关于Salomon的成长发展数据以及成功的一些因素，在行业内相对还是比较清楚的，所以希望今天晚上能有一个比较愉快的交流，谢谢。AS: 好的，感谢李总，那我们就进入问答，先问一下您这边估测的情况，三季度包括10月到现在，萨洛蒙它在国内整体的销售增长其实大概是怎么样的，它的线上、线下渠道的这种增速表现是不是有很大的差异，如果有比较大的差异，您大概能分析一下原因是什么吗？BL: 差异不是很大，从我们观测到的销售数据来看，从1月份到9月份，差不多平均增长率在40%左右，所以即使亚玛芬收购Salomon 5年以后，它也仍旧保持一个相当高速的成长，所以这个最大的优势来源还是安踏集团对于Salomon品牌的建造，以及对于更宽广渠道的扩展，因为2025年的开店数量差不多是225家左右，到2026年，截止到现在已经超过了300家，所以它来自于同比店铺的增长，同时也来自于新开店数的绝对增长带来销售额的增长，对于线上线下的增长比率，我观测到的数据情况是差不多的，也就是线上和线下同时处于高速增长的状态，当然线上会略高一些，因为线上现在也有很多渠道进行扩展，比如说线上原来我们认为只有天猫和京东，现在对于抖音甚至在抖音这个销售矩阵里面，Salomon的布局也是比较充分和完整，还有其他可能边缘的。AS: 您刚才说的是1-9月份的情况，如果单看三季度的话，跟上半年去比，这个增速有降下来一点吗？还是说还是维持在40%左右？BL: 三季度的增速会降下来一些，因为三季度对于整个运动偏户外方向的增长，一般都会弱一些，因为三季度处于一个，第一个是客单价，也就是产品的件单价相对要低一些，比如说冬季，比如说春季，主推的产品，包含了防水系列和厚装的徒步系列，客单价会高一点，件单价也会相对高一些，对于三季度来讲推的这种轻薄款、透气款会低一些，所以三季度会放缓，但是并不影响全年的高速增长。AS: 这个三季度从同比增速来看的话。BL: 大概5%上下，差不多35%左右。AS: 那也差得不是很多。BL: 差不多，整体增长整个品牌的角度来讲还是比较强劲的。AS: 如果我们分系列来看，还是看三季度，如果分系列，比如像它的徒步、跑步、越野，公路跑、越野什么的，还有S- LAB，我看到好像还有一个恢复鞋这个系列，XT系列，这些系列来看。BL: 对，您还是非常了解这个系列。不好意思，您的问题好像没问完。AS: 没事，我其实就想问一下分系列看，它们的对比情况大概是怎么样的，是不是也差异比较大，可能哪些会表现特别好，哪些就很平平无奇？BL: Salomon品牌从全球欧洲的角度上来讲，Salomon是一个全品类的户外品牌，它包含了登山徒步，包含了滑雪，也包含了跑步，也就是越野跑，中国从2004年引进这个品牌，引进Salomon到中国以后，因为考虑到这个品牌的产品过度地宽泛，对于品牌的发展是不利的，所以就聚焦在了越野跑领域，所以Salomon进入中国以后，你可以理解为就像时尚品牌CK一样，它只专向于某一个单项的产品进行了市场的拓展，所以你现在想到CK品牌，你觉得它就是一个内衣裤的品牌，它不是一个巨大的牛仔品牌。对Salomon来讲也是一样的，如果到欧洲、到法国，大家都觉得Salomon是一个全品类的品牌，干什么户外活动都可以买Salomon的产品，但是在中国你只能认为Salomon是一个鞋子的品牌，是一个越野跑的品牌，是一个越野跑跑步又偏潮流的品牌，它不是一个完整的户外品牌，所以基于此你从这个品牌的品类里面再将它细分成品类，这个意义其实不是特别大，因为就会特别地细分，包括您刚刚说的这个XT系列，这是Salomon最初由安踏营销出来的爆款，差不多是2020年的样子，这是2019年安踏收购亚玛芬，同时拥有Salomon这个品牌以后，对Salomon做了第一次改变，就是单独营销了这几款产品，叫XT系列，XT系列是整个Salomon产品里面最硬核，最越野的产品，它的单价是1680-1780这么一个价位，所以可以说是占据了整个运动鞋售价的一个制高点。随着Salomon整个品牌，特别是鞋类销售额的增长，当然题外话，Salomon现在整个在中国销售额的85%的贡献都是由鞋子提供的，15%是服装，所以随着Salomon本身销售额的增长，那么鞋类的增长它的细分的类别其实并没有那么清楚，反而是价格更敏感了，也就是说从最早的1780的营销的成功，到后来的1280，再到后来的980，再到现在的780，其实是他有一个明显的低价策略的因素，也就是一个正常的市场规模效应，就是越低的价格，理论上来讲你就拥有了越大的人群和越大的人群的购买力，所以销售额的扩展也会更加地友好和快速，如果你要看细分Salomon的产品的话，它其实就特别细分，它在越野跑里面还有硬地跑、沙地跑、泥泞地跑，公路跑里面还有普通公路跑、马拉松跑，还有徒步，还有重型徒步、轻型徒步，休闲，休闲时尚鞋以及溯溪鞋，分类特别的细分，但是这个和其他国际品牌的鞋子的区别也不那么大，也一样的，其他国际的跑鞋、越野鞋也是这么非常细分的产品线。AS: 所以您的意思是说，看萨洛蒙这个鞋子的系列的话，可能还不是特别的，在中国市场还不是特别有意义，看价格带更有意义对吧？BL: 没有任何意义，而且进入到店内购买的客人都不是户外使用，他不是说我准备跑一个300公里的比赛，我准备这次跑的主要是草地，一看哪个鞋子更适合我，没有这样的客户，因为真正专业领域的越野跑鞋还是像凯乐石，还是像HOKA这样

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的品牌比较多，Salomon在真正的越野跑核心领域已经非常少了。AS: 按照价格带来分的话，您这边估算的结果可能是哪个价格带的增速是最快的呢，如果看三季度的话？BL: 900元以下是最快的，900元以下至少是占了销售的70%以上。然后是1100块，900-1100块大概占20%，超过1200占10%左右，这个其实也反向地说明了Salomon现在有300多家店铺，它已经下沉到了三线的城市，比如说河南的驻马店，比如说铜陵，就这样的城市他们其实都有店，下行到这样城市的店铺，需要这样的价格带的产品，或者是你作为一个品牌，你只有拥有了这样价格带的产品以后，你才能下行到这样的城市，因为这样的城市对于购买一双800元的鞋子，运动鞋来讲已经是一个比较大的支出了。AS: 您刚才提到服饰产品的销售占比大概15%对吧？我想问一下，如果我们看2026年一直到现在的话，服饰产品这个占比它的趋势是一直在提升的吗，还是说可能维持在15%左右波动这样的一种状态？BL: 它的趋势一直在提升的，它的趋势一直是在缓慢提升的，因为这里面包含了Salomon产品销售的策略，也就是说第一个Salomon本身这个品牌是一个全品类的户外品牌，而且在欧洲它更倾向于滑雪层面，它是有一个巨强的双板滑雪的产品线，引领了品牌的高度和专业性，然后又扩展了越野跑的鞋子和整个登山徒步的产品线，所以对于中国要重点发展服饰这么一个生意的逻辑，首先它符合了整个品牌在全球产品定位的情况，这不是说它要定位成为一个全品类的品牌，是因为它本身就是一个全品类的情况，中国的销售和中国销售的贡献越来越高以后，他还是希望能够贴近于全球的品牌价值观的，这是第一个。第二个也可以理解为鞋子的增长，鞋子的天花板，鞋子可以用到的渠道以及营销的策略，相对于服装来讲是非常有限的，所以作为品牌更长久增长的动力，服装的增长必须是扩展和扩大的，这样才能够带着品牌能够有一个更持久增长的情况的发生。AS: 那它服饰这一块，比如说它的商品定位、结构，还有产品上新定价方面的策略，大概是怎么去打的，能给我们介绍一下吗，您觉得这些策略可能2027年会不会有一些变化？BL: Salomon我们已经观察了非常长的时间，从亚玛芬到没有被安踏收购之前，Salomon其实已经有一些服装的动作，那个时候的服装主要来自于真正的国际，也就是来自于法国，法国拥有什么样的服装线，中国可以从法国的产品线里面去选择，等到2019年Salomon被安踏收购以后，由安踏集团进行运作以后，Salomon的服装线其实是有斐乐的团队参与会多了一点，但是斐乐团队前两年也产生了下降的情况，所以以及Salomon又出现了非常高速的增长，所以现在的战略调整为第三期的，第一期是法国的货，第二期是斐乐团队参与的货，第三期是韩国渠道的货，因为Salomon在韩国的增长，销售额的主要贡献反而来自于鞋子，所以从全球的，以及从地理接近的角度来讲，大家觉得韩国的产品线是具有一定的机会的，这个方式也将近测试了两年时间，发现还是不太行，或者说韩国的审美设计对于中国客户的理解还是不足的。所以从今年，就是从2026年年初开始Salomon服装的整体战略就回到了中国，中国自行设计、生产和研发，目前看到主打的方向是两个，第一个是越野跑，第二个是滑雪，因为这两个领域对于户外品牌来讲是Salomon非常熟悉的赛道，而且是Salomon已经在全球和中国建立起了非常好的品牌口碑的一个做法，这是一个产品定位，第二个从产品的价格段上来讲，弹性也是比较大的，因为越野跑的产品线可以说是更轻薄。第二个是对滑雪来讲，它就更加偏向于秋冬，所以它基本的定位属于是中等偏上一点点，但是我不知道您对户外品牌有多大理解，您可以理解为差不多是The North Face上下的情况，或者说它明显会比始祖鸟低一个档次，明显比可隆、迪桑特要再低一点点，所以这是它整体在价格体系的定位。从实际价钱的角度上来看，春夏服装的价钱差不多从400-1200块差不多是主流，从冬季来讲，差不多是800到2000多是主流，当然如果更往上它也有非常专业的滑雪服，也有三四千的，这个也是有的，但是这个不是一个主销的贡献。所以从店铺的角度上来讲，未来的店铺再经过一段时间的发展，和渠道扩充以后，Salomon仅现在中国开店的店铺数应该在500家左右，所以开满这500家以后，品牌可能会进入到形象二次调整的时机，这个时候可能服装的产品线也会更加丰富，进入二次升级和渠道调整期也就会出现更大的店铺，现在店铺的面积平均在150平左右，未来可能就要400平左右了，也就是说要有一个非常充分的店铺空间用于容纳更多的服装和再次提升品牌的销售。AS: 那您觉得它现在这个服饰方面的策略算是相对比较稳定，比较成熟吗，还是说可能2027年会有比较大的变化，因为您刚才说了两个方向，滑雪跟越野跑，比如说2027年的时候，会不会新增一些方向，然后其他价格方面会不会有一些变动，比如说价格带往上去挪一挪之类的，您觉得会有这种风向吗？BL: 可能性不大，有两个原因，第一个原因就是Salomon对于中国大市场的评估是要开500家店，现在完成了300家，所以它在没有开满500家之前，应该不会对于鞋子本身的，就是鞋子仍旧是品牌最重要的销售贡献的产品，他不会把非常巨大的精力和时间以及市场支持挪到服装上，服装现在是培育项，而鞋子才是核心项目，所以2026、2027甚至2028变化都不会太大，或者说如果用数字来说的话，现在15%的占比，2028年之前应该不会超过30%的占比，或者30%已经是非常非常极限了，我觉得安踏对于品牌的控制，它的阶段性的任务和目标还是非常清晰的，这是一个。另外一个就是你可以理解为"户外"已经是一个高档的、时尚的、街头的、功能的代名词。所以Salomon在中国的户外已经不是法国、欧洲、美国Salomon的户外，它的核心客户层95%都是不去山野的，不去到真正的户外活动当中的，所以不管它定位在滑雪还是定位在越野跑，它其实影响的还是普通的中产和年轻潮流的人士，所以它扩展产品线对于销售的增长还是要服从于品牌整体的业务。AS: 鞋子方面我想再问一下，他们在9月不是有一个投资者日吗，管理层提到了这个萨洛蒙转向全地形跑步，有一个碎石路，就是Gravel这个场景，而且今年在国内也有举办第二届所谓的碎石路这种跑步的活动，所以我想问一下，这个所谓的碎石

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路是不是刚才您有提到过的，比如说越野跑里面硬地、沙地、泥地，还是说一个新的场景呢？结合您刚才也说了您说在中国市场实际上看这个场景不如去看这个价格带，所以我在想品牌方面这样的一个策略您是如何评价的，既然在中国这个场景可能不是特别有用的话，它去推这么一个场景，去完善这种场景的覆盖，您觉得意义大不大？BL: 如果从意义的角度来讲，意义是不大的，因为碎石的场景在越野跑鞋当中，在很多品牌都有一个专一的品类来应对这个场景，而碎石的场景在中国的山野当中反而是比较少的，所以单独就这个事件营销本身的意义是不大的，但是它有意思，我说的有点那个。你要追求意义没什么意义，这个是一个传统普通的，在我们专业户外人的眼里它是很普通的场景，而且每个品牌只要是定位在越野跑鞋的品牌里面都有，但是它很有意思，它的意义不在于有意义没意义，在于有意思，也就代表着它品牌的市场部对于产品的理解以及对于消费者的痛点或者说热点的抓取还是比较有效的，这是有效的，因为营销最忌讳的是大而无当，就是大而全，我就是越野跑，我就是全世界最专业的，我就是销量最好的，我就是最潮的，最好看的，你会发现这都是过大了，就是大而无当，这些营销不管你花多少钱，你都很难在消费者心中留下一个明确的印象，说这是一个专业品牌。所以这就说明Salomon的市场部对于市场工作的有效性的把控是非常好的，他能找到碎石的一种特性，然后以这个点进行营销和宣传，留给客人的就是Salomon是专业的，这也是现在整个中国所有户外品牌在做的，都不能忘记自己户外的基因，专业的DNA和我们未来能真正给大家带来生意的，是我觉得户外品牌就应该是在，至少它的文化是应该在崇山峻岭当中的，所以这个Salomon从专业性，从保持品牌DNA的角度，从以一个点来引爆消费者，或者宣传的心智的角度上这是成功的，所以我觉得你要问什么意义，没意义，但是这个事有意思吗？挺有意思的，对于行外的人来讲觉得这个太牛了，这个太有趣了，对于我们行内来讲，说得倒也没错，但是你只是重复了行内几十年以来的一个说法，比如说你要营销一个汽车，我更安静，哪个车抗震回声也是很重要的检测标准，为什么你就更安静呢？但是我就是安静，所以对营销来讲，这是一个很有趣的事件，所以你可以理解为没意义，但很有趣。AS: 那它的这个整个跑鞋板块的话，您觉得对于各种场景的覆盖，还有产品对于这种SKU的深度、宽度这种表现大概怎么样，您评价是怎么样的，包括刚才您讲的这些泥地、硬地，还有这种马拉松，普通的公路跑之类的，您觉得可能还有哪些地方需要改善的，或者有些已经是亮点了，并且难以被竞争对手超越的，您大概怎么评价？BL: Salomon因为它是一个真正专业的户外品牌，包括从2019年、2020年安踏对于XT6这款鞋子爆款营销的成功，其实Salomon的情况和其他你所理解的跑鞋的情况正好相反，我说的是类似于昂跑、HOKA、Altra、Brooks，就是这些品牌，当然你要包含亚瑟士、美津浓也没问题，这些品牌来对比，Salomon的情况和他们正好相反，那些品牌都还在不遗余力地追求专业，去追求山野，希望提升自己在山野当中的表现，以各种赛事、比赛测试来去表达出自己是一个专业的户外品牌，拥有最专业的户外基因，对Salomon来讲这些都可以不谈，因为Salomon一直以来都是最专业的那一个，所以Salomon未来可能面对的实际情况和这些品牌相反就在于Salomon其实是要提升它鞋子在都市内穿着的舒适度，就是说那些牌子都是从都市当中来，它们的柔软性、防滑性、舒适性，上脚以后的这种舒适性还是都比较好的，所以他们要去寻求山野，去找到防滑、抗震、防崴脚、碳板这些东西，需要这些硬件去提升，但是Salomon这些其实都是不需要的，他反而要关注到你现在最核心的这些消费者，穿上脚以上的舒适度，这是现在Salomon我认为从它整个产品线里面都还是比较弱的，也就是说Salomon真正擅长做的是一双奔跑在山野当中的鞋，而在真正的办公室、通勤、马路上穿着也依然柔软、舒适，这方面的表现是比较多的。所以那么多的年轻人抢购加价买了XT6，他们上脚的那一刻，因为他们花了很多钱，也花了很多精力，当他们上脚的那一刻，穿上脚的那一刻，他内心里只能觉得这是一双户外鞋，就是又窄又硬，你穿上它给你带来的优越感就像女性穿上了一个很昂贵的高跟鞋，它很帅很亮，但其实一点不舒适。Salomon现在就是大概这种情况，他要关心的是自己的产品要贴合于现在的消费者，数以百万计的消费者买了你的鞋子，但是他的感受都是这是一种户外鞋真硬啊，真好，走在办公室里感觉好滑，如果某一天它潮流的势头有所下降的话，那么消费者会很轻松地就换成其他品牌了，因为这双鞋真正从鞋的角度，带给他的体验不好，可以说不是那么友好，因为它是用于走山地、泥地、沙地、湿地使用的，不是给你办公室穿的，但是相对其他的竞品来讲，比如Lululemon的一些鞋子，比如说HOKA一些鞋子，昂跑一些鞋子，那些品牌的鞋子相对于都市穿着，办公室通勤穿着那就友好非常多了，那就是你能感受到这是一双不错的鞋，确实很轻，也挺柔软的，跑跑步也不错。AS: 我想再追问一下，他们管理层说是要提出一个全地形跑步的策略大方向，如果考虑到这个的话，您觉得Salomon的跑鞋，未来比如说它的功能定位，运动场景的覆盖，设计风格，或者说其他方面的话还可能往哪些方向去拓展，或者说去改进呢？BL: 在亚玛芬时代，也就是2019年之前，Amer Sports对于Salomon的鞋子有一个认知，就是说山野的生意是有限的，因为中国能够参与跑步的人数大概只有50万，但是路跑的人数是很宽广的，所以亚玛芬当年用了2-3年的时间在重点推动路跑，也就是公路跑的这个产品线，但后来并不成功，因为Salomon还是一个小众的户外品牌，它跟亚瑟士、美津浓这样的品牌其实是没办法竞争的，因为那些才是更专业的路跑的鞋子，所以从现在这个角度上来讲，如果说Salomon要扩展自己的产品线，那么往真正路跑的方向走，并且保持自己产品的设计特点来说，还是有机会的，或者说这个机会会更大。AS: 路跑这块再加强。BL: 其实从Salomon的角度来讲，安踏接手的这几年已经完全摒弃了路跑的鞋子了，现在所有的鞋子只有两条产品线，第一条就是越野跑鞋，第二条产品线就是徒步鞋，它其实已经没有路跑鞋了，路跑鞋才是一个真正大众的，能够低价的，能

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够更多增长，单从鞋子角度来讲，有更多增长可能性的，但是因为Salomon还有很宽泛的服装，所以它还是有选择的，对品牌来讲，它可以选择我的鞋子就保持专业，保持户外专业，保持我的越野跑，保持我的徒步没问题，我剩余的增长就来自于服饰了，我可以好好扩展好我的服饰，这个对于扩展服饰能带来销售额的增长和扩展鞋子能带来销售额的增长，我认为是服饰。AS: 竞争方面我想问一下，也是跑鞋这块，有市场观点，也是说国内的话越野跑板块，HOKA是Salomon最大竞对，徒步这块应该是凯乐石，不知道您是不是认同？或者说您觉得还有其他的竞对，可能对Salomon形成比较显著的一种竞争威胁。还有您刚才提到公路跑这块，您觉得未来Salomon如果要去发展起来的话，谁可能对它的影响会比较大一些，您大概怎么看？BL: 以户外作为基础来看待Salomon的竞争局面的话，其实它的竞争者还是比较多的，甚至很多时候来自于内部，比如说Salomon在安踏内部竞争的主要对手是始祖鸟，是可隆，是迪桑特，因为它们鞋子的定位和定价，甚至是生产线都是一样的，特别是始祖鸟前期，因为始祖鸟的鞋子大概是2019年上市，所以始祖鸟的鞋子是一个非常年轻的品类，这个品类当年在核算成本和定价的时候，它对标的价钱其实就是Salomon的价钱，所以有相当一段时间，大概有四五年的时间，Salomon的价钱和始祖鸟品牌的价钱的重合度是特别高的，甚至始祖鸟部分鞋子的价钱还低于Salomon，那后来因为始祖鸟本身品牌的档次升得比较快，他也快速地提升的商品的价格，特别是鞋子的价钱，那么现在有一些价差了，也就是说Salomon的人群和始祖鸟的人群大概有一些分开，但是其实仍旧有重合，所以这是他们自己内部的品牌结构的竞争，在鞋子上也是比较激烈的，从外部的角度上来讲，越野跑的竞争对手他其实主要是HOKA和凯乐石，从时尚运动的角度来讲，它的竞争对手其实是昂跑，所以这个是一个竞争的品牌格局。但因为Salomon整体的市场营销，以及做了很多联名，以及与很多潮流人士的这种合作，也代表着更多的销售额还是来自于最深的营销力和对客流的吸引力，而不是说抢了竞品多少生意，或者是竞品抢了Salomon多少生意，这个市场不大，也就是从户外运动鞋的角度上来讲，现在还是一个蓝海的宽广的市场，还不存在Salomon的销售降一点，昂跑、HOKA销售就增一点，不存在的。也就是现在大家各自努力，各自收获。AS: 再问一下服饰呢，服饰商品的竞争力您觉得目前在市场上这个水平怎么样？BL: 服饰角度他们其实没什么竞争力，服饰的角度上没什么特性，就是一个Salomon的户外服装，如果论山野，如果论专业，它跟猛犸象、HAGLOFS、始祖鸟，它都不能比的，但是这些品牌又比它卖得贵，所以它还是有它的空间，但是论时尚、潮流、营销，它好像跟The North Face，跟Goldwin这些品牌比也不太足，所以最后能拯救Salomon服装的还是来自于它整体品牌的营销力，以及服装未来销售额的增长透支的核心其实是鞋子，就是说购买Salomon服装的人80%都是买了一双Salomon的鞋子，所以你可以理解为Salomon的销售的增长大概会有一个明显的周期，就是先用鞋子打开很宽广的市场，然后再出服装，开更大的店，再收割一波曾经买过鞋子的消费者来买服装，这就是它的第二增长曲线，第三次可能销售额就要下行了，就是要下行回归，再找到自己核心的产品和竞争力，然后再营销一次，所以它这个增长曲线可以说是很明显，所以一个的极限值就来自于什么时候开满500家店，第二次极限值就来自于什么时候服装的销售额能占超过40%，所以这就是两次品牌增长曲线的极限值。AS: 再想问一下它在国能目前冬季运动装备这个板块，目前大概是一个什么样的情况？比如说它的商品组合，它的定价情况大概怎么样，您觉得它未来的发展思路还有规划可能会是什么样的，能给我们介绍一下吗？BL: Salomon对于冬季的产品可以说非常重视，非常非常地重视，从两个方面来讲，第一个是从负面的角度来讲，因为Salomon现在主要销售的鞋子产品，其实全部都在春夏，不在冬季，因为越野跑是一个春夏季的活动，冬天就没法跑了，还有时尚潮流的鞋子都是轻薄的，冬天在上海是可以穿的，但是到北方就不太能穿的，因为它冷，它薄，没什么保暖性，所以不得不让他去重视秋冬季的产品，这是一个反向逻辑。就是它的负向的东西必须要有所调整和扭转，让它去拥抱秋冬季来改变自己。第二种如果回到全球的业务，回到法国本土欧洲的业务，Salomon冬季是最强的业务，因为它是以滑雪为主的，它卖滑雪硬件，卖滑雪板、滑雪靴，卖滑雪头盔、滑雪雪镜，卖整套的滑雪服，也就是说如果你是一个滑雪爱好者，你买一套滑雪的产品，顶你买10套越野跑装备，这完全不是一个消费力和装备等级的，所以他们也希望把这一特点引到中国，在中国进行加强，第一是能够扭转秋冬季的弱项，第二是能够增强这个品牌在中国是一个全品类的，品牌力的一个内容，所以秋冬季他们非常重视，所以从整个安踏集团，或者安踏集团说太多了，从整个亚玛芬集团的角度上来讲，他们都非常注重培养Salomon在冬季滑雪类这个产品的增长，所以Amer Sports，这是亚玛芬的英文名，Amer Sports会开独立的滑雪店，名字就叫Amer Sports。Salomon的产品也会在雪场开独立的Salomon滑雪店，甚至它也会赞助很多滑雪场的消费者去使用Salomon的产品，所以滑雪产品是Salomon在秋冬季非常重要的产品线和销售额的来源，这是他们的战略，他们的希望。AS: 消费者认可吗，目前这些产品什么的？还有您觉得这个商品组合定价方面，这个切入点算比较合理吗，比较有效吗？BL: 还是非常合理的，因为Salomon本身在欧洲和全球主要还是一个滑雪品牌，所以它在中国继续营销滑雪是没有问题的，对于战略的角度来讲，和从长期的角度来讲这是合理的，非常好了，因为它基本上还有一个大招还没有充分地去用，所以对于这个品牌它增长的韧性还是够的，但是对于现实情况来讲是很痛苦的，因为滑雪热在中国其实已经过了，核心在2021年之前，那是中国的冬奥会。现在整个滑雪市场，滑雪消费者其实是处于收缩的状态，但是安踏启动这个项目的时候已经

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比较晚了，因为他2019年完成收购，真正接手运作已经是2020年了，等他缓过劲2021年冬奥已经过了，所以从短期内来讲效应不会特别大，但是长期来讲这样做是对的。但是因为现在整个鞋子的增长是比较好的，所以他自己内部本身也不追求短期效应的强劲表现，他是希望参与，是希望能够布局，如果滑雪产品以及冬季产品有良好的增长和销售额贡献，是有一个对于品牌增长很强劲的时候，那个接入点应该是现在的时尚潮流的这些鞋子的下降以后，他希望秋冬季，希望滑雪类的产品能够承载住未来可能会面临的潮流鞋子的下降，所以我觉得他们是在做一个明显策略性准备的工作。AS: 耐心也更多。BL: 他有耐心，因为鞋子的增长显然还没有到尽头，或者说滑雪的销售以及秋冬季的增长，他还有两步要走完，第一步是要走完开满500家鞋店，第二步是500家鞋店开满以后，他要把现在15%服装的销售额调配到40%，等到这两项都用完以后，冬季滑雪再发力都还来得及。AS: 再想问一下，9月的投资者日，他们管理层也提到了国内的萨洛蒙服饰商品平均售价是有所提升的，不知道您是不是了解，比如说是哪些服饰商品零售价提升，还是说是一个全面的提升，提升的幅度大概是怎么样的，另外您大概是怎么理解这次服饰提价背后的逻辑？BL: 其实服饰本身没有提价，原来服饰的增长，你等我说完你就理解了。服饰本身是没有提价的，还是非常稳定的，为什么会说提价呢？说到提价的原因就在于服饰的销售额占比增长主要来自于服饰的垂直扩张，也就是服饰的品类增加了，比如说原来Salomon主要卖的是，我说你能听懂的，卖T恤、卖短裤、卖运动衣，它的这个价钱就是500、800、1600，就这样了，因为它鞋子才卖900，买件衣服花1600已经够贵了。但是随着Salomon品牌影响力的增长和粉丝的扩展，以及Salomon品牌投资的增加，你现在Salomon的店里你可以很轻松就买到一件2000块钱的产品，所以销售额也增加了，然后你算下来它的平均件单价也增加了，所以它的产品并没有提价，而是做了扩展，你可以理解为原来奥迪车最大众的是A6，想体验一下就买A4，他这会儿直接增加了A8和Q7，一下就让消费者的购买力上升了很多，然后他在算年度平均销售额的时候，或者说年度平均件单价的时候，那就上来了，你从外界看，你感觉市场涨价了，其实它没有涨价，反而是它的产品类别扩展了，它有更贵的商品，把它的平均价拉升了，但并不是说它贵了，因为它原来那件T恤卖400块，那件帽衫卖900块，现在还是400块和900块，这个没有变化。AS: 想再问一下跑鞋产品，跑鞋产品您有没有看到吊牌价提升的动作，或者推出来的新品跑鞋，它平均新品的售价可能是高于以前新品的平均售价的有吗？BL: 没有，这个其实相反，这个恰恰相反。AS: 还在降是吧？BL: 鞋子以刚刚服装的逻辑来讲，正好在反向，就是鞋子也在出新，也有贵的，但是现在鞋子主销的价钱反而是在必降的。AS: 我想再追问一下，您说的主销的价格，它这个降下来之后，到目前这个水平，这个主销的价格，新品的价格稳住了没有，还是比如说明年主销的新品价格还会再往下降一降？BL: 还是比较稳定的，我觉得他们也不能再降了，但是可以理解为降价有很多种逻辑，第一种是这个产品本身的定价就是880元，它就这个价了，第二种逻辑是这件产品定价是980块，但是我卖8折，那我就只卖840块，那你认为这是降价了呢？还是涨价了呢？所以这个价钱对于品牌的策略其实有很多种，现在Salomon处于是一个比较好的策略，这件产品我就卖880块，我就是880块的鞋，我980的就是980的，我不会把980打个8折卖840，所以你可以说这是品牌策略一个好的方向，也就是说品牌还拥有一次向消费者打折销售的机会，也就是说它仍旧对于市场的可控性和未来品牌增长的储备能量值还是有的。AS: 折扣方面我还想再问一下，比如说像Salomon现在的一些过季的产品，比如说过季一年，或者过季一年以上的这种，他现在处理这些产品折扣的策略跟以前相比有没有变化，是不是说我现在2026年过季产品的零售折扣也在收窄，不知道有没有这样的一个趋势呢？还是说可能跟2025年相比，原来过季产品我打8折，今年也打8折，没有什么变化？BL: 没有什么变化，因为品牌目前仍旧处于高速增长期，就是说核心的产品依然属于供不应求的一种状态，因为它还在一个粗放发展期，还在开更多的店，获得更多的订单，然后卖给更多的消费者，所以它现在属于粗放的增长状态，是处于库存不太够用的状态，而不是处于库存过量的状态，所以它的折扣的控制，甚至是奥莱店折扣的条件还是非常正常的。AS: 这方面的折扣他也没必要再收窄是吧，比如说2025年过季打8折，今年过季我只打9折？BL: 因为都没货怎么收窄，你不需要收窄。AS: 不是，我的意思收窄，比如过季一年的，2025年的时候是打8折，因为现在卖得太好了，2026年过季一年的，我反而只打9折了，我不打8折了，有没有这样？BL: 那没有。AS: 您的意思就是他也不需要这样去干是吗？BL: 他不需要，或者他要留着这招以后再用，而不是现在用。AS: 刚才不好意思没听到，您说。BL: 没有，整个的折扣情况还是非常稳定的，他们不希望把折扣调高，让消费者理解要涨价了，也不会调低折扣，因为我没有过量的库存需要去清货。

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AS: 还有关于门店您刚才也讲了，之前也说过未来要开到500家，现在已经有300家了，还有200家的空间，如果这样的话，我在想过季品一些售卖的渠道，比如奥莱店您觉得未来可能还会开多少家呢？BL: 那你以什么样的店铺为基础呢？AS: 我的意思是比如说未来它如果新开200家店的话，目前的这些奥莱店，或者专门卖过季品的店，是不是可能就没办法去承受这个量了，多出来的这些量。BL: 对，肯定的，他还要开更多的奥莱。AS: 那您觉得这个奥莱店可能比如说未来新增200家店，那奥莱店可能相应的配套要开多少家，这个配套比例大概是怎么样的？BL: 对于核心的城市的配套比例大概是5: 1，对于500家左右的店铺，大概是8: 1。AS: 整体是8: 1。BL: 8家正价店铺，开一个奥莱，开一个特价店铺。AS: 那个比例其实也挺高的，500家比1的话，就有几十家是奥莱店。BL: 很正常，如果你的品牌地位在一线城市，比如说北京、上海、深圳，你就不下省会城市吧，这个级别的品牌的奥莱配比差不多是5: 1，就是5家正价店需要开一家奥莱店，反而是下行到二三线城市，你更大的规模上来以后，你的比率会下降，差不多是8: 1。AS: 还有关于萨洛蒙门店的一些客流量、客单价、连带率什么的，还有一个同店销售的增速表现，您大概能给我们介绍一下吗，您这边的一些估测情况大概怎么样的，如果我们还是看三季度的话？BL: 客单价的水平差不多在1100元上下，这个基本上围绕80%的销售，客流量的情况取决于不一样的购物中心，它本身带来的客流量的大小，也就是说所有Salomon核心购物中心的店铺，它所依靠的仍旧是这个购物中心对于客流量吸附的能力，那么从销售额的增长上，我们也仍然可以看到品牌客流量的增速也是不错的。连带率来讲，对于鞋子来讲，连带率的情况如果是按照鞋品来讲，那是很正常的，1.5左右。就是平均两个人买走3双鞋这么一个逻辑。但是从户外整体的品牌来讲，Salomon的连带率还是比较差的，因为它没什么服装，如果回到户外这些品牌，始祖鸟、Patagonia、Marmot这些品牌当中，它的连带率是比较差的，那些品牌将近可以达到2.2、2.5这样，如果是达到2.5的话，就是两个人要买走5件商品，两位顾客买走5件商品，所以对于客流的增长倒问题不是很大，随着销售额的增加，对于店铺同比的销售，未来还是有一些挑战的，因为鞋子流行趋势的变化也比较快，而且鞋子对于流行度的掌控，所能调整的内容可以说是很有限的。AS: 我想再跟您问一下，三季度到现在萨洛蒙一些老店，它这个同店销售有增长吗，还是说有下滑的？BL: 同比是有增长的，同比增长大概25%左右，整个品牌的增长既有同比增长，也有规模增长，规模增长就加上新店的增长。AS: 同比25%已经算挺不错了。BL: 还可以吧，现在户外整个的热度还都不错，大家基本上都保持这个水平，只是说萨洛蒙的25%的增长，确实已经非常厉害了，因为它现在的总体体量是够大的了。AS: 那您对于四季度跟明年上半年它的这个同店的一些表现，比如说还是我们刚才讲的一些客单、连带、同店销售，您的判断大概怎么样？BL: 保持30%的增速是肯定的，没什么问题。AS: 就是同店有30%。BL: 现在市场对于Salomon开新店的呼声还是非常高的，或者中国每家购物中心都想开家Salomon的店，这就像当年的阿迪、耐克一样，开遍整个中国2000家商场的机会都是在的，但是Salomon的表现还是比较克制，我最多开500家，这是明确的一个目标。AS: 您说的这个同店增30%，是四季度也有这个水平，2027年上半年还有这个水平是吗？BL: 对，肯定的，因为它已经连续高速增长了5年时间了，而且它的目标仍旧还有一定的距离，你想从300家店到500家店，这还有多大店铺数的增长，所以它保持这个增长问题不是很大，再加上包括刚刚说的价格和折扣的情况，Salomon现在还是比较稳定的，即使在开满店铺500家的情况下，它仍然还有一次调整的机会，那就是打折，其实和斐乐的策略和增长曲线还是很像的。AS: 那它这个四季度跟明年上半年客单跟连带可能不会有什么太大的差异。BL: 不会有什么变化，不会有本质的变化的，上上下下可能也就两三个点，但是没什么意义，如果服装持续增加的话，未来的件单价可能会增加。AS: 据您了解，据您了解，国内这个Salomon门店的话，这个单店年营收做得好的，跟做得一般的，大概分别在什么样的范围，这种差距会非常大吗？能举个例子吗？BL: 举个例子，你这个营收差距会非常大，比如说拿无锡万象城，这一家店的年销售额大概是600万，你比如说回到了Salomon上海新天地的店，这家店铺的年销售额超过2500万。

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AS: 管理层他们说到2031年，平均每店的年营收要超过400万美元，您觉得这个目标算是一个比较合理的目标，或者说能达成的目标吗？BL: 400万折合人民币就是2500万吧，很有难度，非常有难度，你说2031年吧？AS: 对，我记得他说2031年。BL: 这个应该是他们的战略目标，因为如果说达到这个战略目标的高度的话，Salomon的销售就超过了100亿，你可以理解其实并不是400万美元的因素，是100亿人民币销售额倒推的数字，这个合理的都已经不重要了，重要的是他们必须把100亿的销售倒推出来。每家店2500万，全国有400家店，那不是100亿了吗，那个时候可能会完成像始祖鸟前期的一个策略，叫收缩性增长，就是把500家店调改到400家店，每家店铺平均销售额超过2500万。AS: 还有想问一下，Salomon现在对于男性客群还有女性目标客群，有没有这种资源跟费用分配的一个倾向性，比如说倾向于女性目标客群？BL: 没有偏好，他在营销的时候没有偏好，因为从营销学的角度上来讲，他们现在主要关注的还是年轻人的层面，只要你关注年轻人以后，就没有什么性别的概念了，因为对于年轻、时尚、潮流，很多东西都是跨性别的。AS: 这个Salomon会员复购率大概在什么样的范围，在业内处于大概什么样的水平，是比较好的，还是中档的？BL: 属于非常好的。AS: 大概在什么样的范围？复购大概有多少？BL: 复购率超过50%。AS: 算头部的？BL: 对，也就是说超过50%的消费者至少有两双Salomon的鞋子。AS: 最后再问一个小问题，因为您刚才也说同店四季度跟2027年上半年已经有30%了，那如果再加上他新的拓店的话，您大概估测一下，四季度跟2027年上半年可能整体的销售增速趋势也还能达到差不多接近40%这样一个水平吗？BL: 完全可以，我估计不会有什么偏差，因为有两个可控条件，第一个是市场的存量仍然还是比较大，第二个开店的规划以及货品的准备这两个都是确定的值，或者说从安踏内部的角度上，从Salomon内部的角度来讲，40%的增长已经完成了，因为明年这些店，计划新开的店已经签完约了，只要在上半年开始卖，货也都准备好了，只要1月份、2月份能到货，就已经完成了，所以这个的可控性还是有的，只是说我们在这儿聊这个事，就是感觉还是有一些预测的概念，但是从实操的角度讲已经不存在了，明年1-6月份销售的店铺签约以及产品，在今年的7月份就已经订完了。AS: 我们今天时间也差不多，感谢李总，访谈就到这儿，辛苦您，感谢。BL: 没问题，再见。AS: 谢谢，拜拜.

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10/11/2026 at 11:36 AM UTC